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China’s rise has been met with both hope and apprehension. However, with its recent
actions in the South and East China Seas, surrounding nations are becoming increasingly
concerned that China may have expansionist or even hegemonic ambitions. China has taken what
many of these countries consider to be aggressive actions in the past several years and months.
One of the main questions now is how the surrounding nations, as well as the United States, will
react to China’s actions. As of now diplomatic means of failed to resolve the crisis in the South
and East China Seas.
This thesis will document the diplomatic means that have been utilized in vain by China’s
neighbors before asking whether or not those nations which surround China may choose to form
an alliance in order to offset its increasingly aggressive rise. Specifically, we will examine the
challenges inherent to forming such an organization in the region and contrast our hypothetical
Asian-Pacific alliance with the NATO alliance in Europe. We hope to contribute to the current
discussion and literature surrounding the rise of China from a Structural Realist perspective.
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CHAPTER I: STATING THE CASE
In this first chapter, we will introduce the thesis and our thesis question. Next, we will
study the historical background of the region which we are studying. Following that section we
will examine the theoretical basis of our thesis before moving on to current literature. Finally, we
will explain our methodology before the beginning of the second chapter.
Introduction
Today, in the Asian-Pacific region, it seems as if a new Cold War is heating up. Within
that region, China is defying international law by making claims to, and seizing, the territory of
its neighbors in the South China Sea. Its unprecedented and aggressive actions have not only
shocked the world, but are precipitating a diplomatic crisis. In a move to reassure allies and
confront China, the United States has attempted to dissuade China through diplomatic and nonviolent military means. Likewise, regional nations have begun to take actions to strengthen their
territorial holdings and military footing. Much like the Soviet Union of the 20th century, China is
emerging as the 21st century adversary of the United States and its Asian-Pacific allies. But how
will the United States and the nations of the Asian-Pacific region respond to the emerging
Chinese threat and the volatile crisis of the South China Sea? How can the scales of power be
balanced? Could these Asian nations and the United States choose, as their European
predecessors did with NATO, to build a military alliance? And if they did, what would be the
challenges inherent in building such a military, NATO-type alliance in the Asian-Pacific region?
To better answer this question, it is useful to return to the original Cold War and an original Cold
Warrior who called for the original NATO alliance.
Winston Churchill was, without a doubt, one of the greatest visionary statesmen of the
20th century. He was a man who possessed the ability to see far into the future, predicting the
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outcome of events that would take years to materialize. Churchill began his fortune telling career
by predicting the rise of Nazi Germany and the eventual conflict that would unfold. At the time,
his contemporaries thought him both brash and melodramatic; they proclaimed “peace in our
time” (Chamberlain, 1938). However, following the great slaughter of more than fifty million
people, he had earned the respect, and the ears, of not only his fellow countrymen but of the
world as well. Thus, it was with great anticipation in 1946 that American and British statesmen
and even the President of the United States, gathered at Westminster College to hear the old
Prime Minister offer up one more sobering prediction (Manchester, 2013).
This new prophecy foresaw the Soviet Union–until that time considered an ally of the
West–as an emerging adversary and enemy of the United States and the Western world in
general. During the Second World War, the Soviet Union had proved to be an invaluable partner,
smashing the German war machine, rolling back the Nazi invasion of Eastern Europe, and
capturing the last Nazi stronghold, the capital city of Berlin. However, following the end of the
war, democratic and Western allies of Stalin’s Soviet state came to realize they had made a deal
with the devil. While the United States demobilized and sent home millions of soldiers, its
Russian counterpart did not, leaving the smoldering ruins of Europe a veritable open henhouse
(Manchester, 2013).
Following one diplomatic crisis after another, relations between the United States and the
Soviet Union slowly deteriorated until they reached a crisis point. The Soviets had been
subversively extending and consolidating their control over Eastern Europe through local
communist parties and corrupt officials. However, when Soviet forces blockaded Berlin and
refused to let Allied forces enter, it was the last straw.
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Seeing the fall of Eastern Europe to the Soviets and not wanting to exchange an Iron
Cross for an Iron Curtain, the Western democracies of Europe, including Great Britain and
France, signed the Treaty of Brussels. This treaty compelled each signatory nation to come to the
defense of any other member country should that nation be invaded or attacked. However, the
treaty’s guarantee rang hollow as, absent the aid of the United States, no country in Europe could
hope to stand up to the might of the Soviet Empire. But Churchill had foreseen the vacuum that
was present in Europe and the need for the United States to fill it. In his famous Iron Curtain
speech, he implored America to take up the mantel left by the British Empire and to protect the
Western world through an American-led alliance of European democracies. Thus, in 1949 the
United States met the challenge given to them by Churchill, facing down the Soviet Union and
securing Europe by creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). For forty years,
NATO provided the continent with a collective security guarantee whereby each member nation
would treat an attack on another member as if they themselves had been attacked. NATO
standardized militaries, strategies, and command structures used to fight the Cold War and
provided a potent deterrent against any Soviet aggression. And though these signatory nations
came close several times to an all-out war with the Soviets, the NATO alliance and its deterrents
proved to be too powerful to challenge directly (Mastney, 2006).
Today, the Soviet threat which once menaced Europe is no more than a memory, and
many would argue that while NATO was once fantastically successful, it has now outlived its
mission. And yet, if Churchill were alive today, he might once again make a prediction, and this
time he would be pointing to an entirely different region of the globe. In South East Asia, a new
drama–like the Soviet drama of old–is playing out and becoming more and more fractious by the
day. And while the setting is different and the players have changed, the story is still the same.
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The South and East China Seas are the new arenas of conflict, and within them, an aggressive
China is unilaterally enforcing its will on the region. This emerging conflict centers on maritime
sovereignty in these seas, with the countries that populate these waters each bringing separate
and competing claims. Here, instead of territory being demarcated by clearly defined borders, the
region is a crazy quilt of overlapping and competing claims. While most of these claims have
existed for more than a century without significant conflict, this issue has recently and rapidly
come to a head with the unchecked and hostile actions of the People’s Republic of China (CFR,
2016).
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Figure 1. South China Sea Claims. Reprinted from “Dispute in the South China Sea: a Legal
Primer” Mirsky S., In LawFare, 2015, Retrieved October 15, 2016 from
https://www.lawfare.com/dispute-south-china-sea-legal-primer
In the South China Sea, which is the main theater of contention and the one with the
largest number of claimants, China has asserted its claim to the lion’s share of that water world.
It does this by appealing to ancient fishing traditions and hundred-year-old maps depicting a
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nine-dash territorial line which scallops more than ninety percent of the South China Sea.
Unfortunately, this nine-dash line intersects almost every other nation’s territorial claims, claims
largely based on post-war maritime law. Thus, for well over fifty years, these South East Asian
countries have been deadlocked over how to resolve their competing claims, but the
disagreements have never escalated significantly. But the world at large, and that region in
particular, has changed dramatically within these last fifty years. In that span of time, South East
Asia has emerged as a global center of production and trade. With more than $5.3 trillion dollars
of trade and millions of barrels of oil passing through these waters every year, this once regional
dispute has morphed into an issue with global implications. Additionally, the region is host to a
tremendous amount of natural resources and is geographically strategic as well. And that is,
perhaps, why China is done waiting for diplomatic solutions and has asserted its dominance in
the region in a way never before seen in modern times (CFR, 2016).
While decades ago there were brief conflicts over the small islands and reefs that dot the
South China Sea, by the 1980’s the situation had largely stabilized with only a peppering of
subsequent episodes (Navarro, 2015). Yet recently, in the last five to six years, China has
escalated tensions to levels never before seen. This new round of contention over the sea and
regional boundaries began anew with China attempting to strengthen its territorial claims by
shadowing and harassing US Naval warships and planes, as well as the oil and fishing vessels of
other surrounding nations. US Navy Surveillance ships have been routinely intercepted and, at
times, their sophisticated towed sonar arrays have been damaged by Chinese submarines (Starr,
2009). Likewise, US military planes were, and still are, intercepted and shadowed. In 2012 China
took the startling step of seizing Scarborough Shoal, a submerged reef, from the Philippines. It
has since been shut off from Philippine naval, coast guard and fishing vessels. But the real tour
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de force has been the capture and transformation of many other contested underwater reefs
throughout the region into new, sandy islands (CFR, 2016).
The Tian Jing Hao, the largest dredging ship in Asia, is a modern marvel of engineering.
This German-designed dredger, accompanied by hundreds of barges, has sucked up and piled
thousands of tons of sand atop at least seven reefs in the South China Sea, thus making them into
new de-facto Chinese islands. This ambitious Chinese strategy to assert dominion over the South
China Sea has truly accelerated the once stagnant territorial conflict into a fast-paced, diplomatic
nightmare. But as the sand has settled, this protracted conflict has not. On the contrary, even
though China has been solidifying its territorial claims with these projects, it has continued to
escalate tensions in other more threatening ways (CFR, 2016).
In the East China Sea, the region above the South China Sea, China has recently and
arbitrarily declared an air defense zone where there had previously been none–an air zone that
conveniently overlaps islands in that region which China now claims. In a further escalation of
tensions, it has come to light that anti-ship missiles have been installed on older, more
established Chinese islands in the South China Sea. To many observers this is an indication that
China intends to militarize its new islands as well and, in doing so, the entire South China Sea
region would then become a militarized and potentially dangerous new territory completely
controlled by China (Panda, 2016).
In the face of Beijing’s my way or the highway attitude, neighboring nations in the
region have thus far attempted to resolve the emerging crisis by diplomatic and legal routes. The
longstanding arbiter of this conflict has been the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN). ASEAN is a regional economic pact which includes every claimant of the South
China Sea, except for China and Taiwan. While ASEAN is primarily an economic association, it
7

has a long history of successfully arbitrating conflicts in the region (Chia, 2015). Despite this, the
organization has had little to no success in convincing China to peacefully resolve its disputes in
the region. This is in large part due to infighting within the organization. ASEAN members
Cambodia and Laos, which maintain close diplomatic and economic ties with China and have
consistently taken its side, are in direct conflict with other member nations who have competing
claims with China. In fact, the deadlock within the organization has become so bad that
following a recent meeting in Cambodia with Chinese diplomats to discuss contentious issues
related the South China Sea, the meeting failed to release a joint statement, something that has
not happened once in the organization’s forty-plus year history (Palatino, 2015). But perhaps the
most damning bellwether of ASEAN’s inability to effectively resolve the disputes in the South
China Sea was its almost immediate retraction of several statements that appeared to rebuke
China’s heavy-handed tactics. ASEAN, “expressed our (ASEAN’s) serious concerns over recent
and ongoing developments, which have eroded trust and confidence, increased tensions and
which may have the potential to undermine peace, security and stability in the South China Sea.”
The retraction of these tepid statements, which did not even single out China, occurred only
hours after the statements had been released to the public (Thayer, 2016a). Furthermore, sources
within ASEAN confirmed that Chinese diplomates heavily pressured ASEAN officials to retract
the statements (Beech, 2016). It is clear that ASEAN is more concerned with preserving markets
than it is with the territorial integrity of its member states. Yet while ASEAN continues to walk
on diplomatic egg shells, Beijing continues to smash them. For instance, at the recent Shangri La
dialogues, a regional forum created as a means of encouraging communication between various
Asian countries, China adopted a strident and inflexible tone, loudly reasserting its supposedly
immutable claim to the South China Sea (WONG, 2016). Perhaps the final nail in the coffin for a
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diplomatic solution has been China’s refusal to accept the July 2016 ruling of the Permanent
Court of Arbitration in its judgement of China and the Philippine’s competing South China Sea
claims (PRC, 2016). The court, a long established and respected institution, predating even the
United Nations, took up the dispute when the Philippines brought the case before them. In a
stunning landmark ruling, the court unanimously rejected China’s historic-based claims to the
South China Sea. Yet, despite being a party to the court and formally recognizing its legitimacy,
the Chinese government has thus far refused to recognize the ruling (Phillips, 2016). The
rejection of this tried and true historic method of resolving international disputes is certainly
troubling, and must leave observers contemplating the likelihood of a diplomatic solution to the
South China Sea dispute. This is a new reality, one which forces the remaining Asian-Pacific
states to contemplate their responses to mounting Chinese aggression.
With the door to dialogue seemingly slammed shut, the remaining states have begun to
talk to one another. Military ties between these regional nations are being strengthened, and
cooperation with the United States is increasing. Japan, a key player in the regional disputes and
an emerging adversary of China, has strengthened its ties to nations such as the Philippines and
Vietnam by selling them military hardware and participating in regional wargames (Sekiguchi,
2015). The United States, likewise, is strengthening and reaffirming its ties to the region in an
effort to strengthen its position there and reassure regional allies. Vietnam is drawing closer to its
former enemy the United States, and has been exempted from a long standing US weapons
embargo in an apparent move to strengthen that country’s defenses (Harris, 2016). Even nations
such as India, that are seemingly removed from the emerging conflict, nevertheless feel the press
of China, and are strengthening their ties in the region (Parrikar, 2016). Thus, in the countries
surrounding the South and East China Seas, one can see the emerging outline of a great
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balancing act taking place as threatened countries begin to band together against a common
threat. In fact, the Asian-Pacific region may well be seeing the embryonic stages of a NATOtype alliance forming against China. The European NATO, while maintaining ties with various
countries in the region, does not claim any Asian-Pacific countries as members. This is
understandable as NATO’s official and historical mission has centered almost exclusively on
Europe. Furthermore, few if any scholars see the role of European NATO expanding outside of
this sphere. Thus, in the absence of an expansion of the European NATO the nations of East and
Southeast Asia may find that a military alliance is one of their only recourses against an
intransigent China. But what are the real world obstacles to get from point A to point B? That is
to ask, what are the challenges the nations of the Asia-Pacific region would face in forming their
own version of NATO?
To answer this question, we will need to break down our discussion into it several distinct
sections. First, in order to ground the proceeding discussion, we will first delve into the
economic, military and societal history of the region over the past two hundred years. From there
we will examine the current academic and theoretical literature on alliances and the efforts to
manage the rise of China in the Asia-Pacific region. Subsequently, a brief discussion of the
methodology used will then be followed by series of challenges that would confront nations
attempting to build an Asian-Pacific alliance. Throughout the paper we will compare and
contrast the original European NATO with our new hypothetical Asian-Pacific NATO. In doing
this, we will be able to better understand the challenges facing any prospective Asian-Pacific
alliance while looking to history for solutions to those challenges. At the end of the paper, we
hope to have a more comprehensive understanding of the Asian-Pacific region, the rise of China,
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and the unique challenges that make the forming of a military defense-pact in the Asian-Pacific
region different than the formation of other military alliances in regions such as Europe.
Historical Background
One could review thousands of years of Asian-Pacific history, but for the purposes of this
discussion, we will focus on the broad, sweeping historical events of the last two hundred years.
The reverberations from that period are still felt today and have, to a large extent, shaped the
conflict as it is today. In the time before this period, Asia, and especially China, was host to one
of the greatest and most advanced empires of antiquity. Trade and culture flourished during that
time and China prospered as a result. Yet during the 19th century, in one of its more inwardfacing periods, China enacted strict trading laws, demanding only silver in exchange for its
highly coveted goods. British merchants, unwilling to pay this heavy price, circumvented this defacto tax by engaging in the lucrative trade of opium. Outraged, the Chinese cracked down on the
illegal trade, which ultimately led to a war with the British Empire. The British were victorious
in this first Opium War, and forced their defeated rivals to reform their trading policies, legalize
the market for opium, and pay for war damages. The end of this first Opium War also marked the
beginning of the so-called “Century of Humiliation” during which China was subjected to a slew
of what they labeled as “unfair treaties” and other forms of foreign intervention. It was this
period that would permanently scar the Chinese psyche and become a source of shame and anger
for generations to come (Navarro, 2015). But not every nation in Asia suffered through trade
with the West. Some, in fact, prospered and thrived from it.
To the east of China, the isolated, feudal country of Japan–seemingly stuck in a medieval
time warp–received a surprising wakeup call from the American Navy commander Commodore
Perry. Perry, whose heavily armed naval flotilla blockaded the then-Japanese capital of Edo,
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gave the Japanese an ultimatum: open your county to trade or else. Left with no alternatives, the
Japanese accepted this ultimatum. But seeing how their neighbors to the West had effectively
lost their sovereignty to the colonial nations of Europe, the Japanese approached trade somewhat
differently. Instead of attempting to stall or retard the opening of their country to trade, the
Japanese embraced both trade with the West and modernity with open arms. This period, known
as the Meiji Restoration, saw legions of young Japanese men sent to Europe so that Japan could
learn the secrets of the West and, thus, replicate them. And with this replication came the rapid
and breathtaking modernization of Japan into a formidable Asian power. Even today, Japan is
characterized by its economic dominance and dynamism. And in contrast to its Chinese
neighbor, Japan maintains a closer relationship to the West established through generations of
open markets and free trade (Walker B., 2015).
The contrast between China and Japan soon bifurcated into a gaping chasm. Widened by
the former’s hopelessly backward ways and the latter’s deft mastery of the ultramodern, this split
was nowhere better demonstrated than during the first Sino-Japanese war of 1894. When Japan
emerged as the undisputed winner a year later, it took with it the formerly Chinese possessions of
Korea and Taiwan. This was the start of the mighty Japanese Empire, an imperial system that
would dominate Asia until the middle part of the 20th century. This dominance was
spectacularly displayed during the Russo-Japanese war. During a brief but devastating encounter
with the Japanese Navy in the Strait of Tsushima, the Russian Baltic fleet was virtually wiped
out. No one any longer questioned the ability of the Japanese (Walker B., 2015).
On the other side of the East China Sea, bitter hardship and the humiliation of foreign
domination inspired one of the largest uprisings in history, the Chinese Boxer Rebellion. Steeped
in mysticism and supported in part by the ruling Qing Dynasty, the Boxer Rebellion was a
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grassroots uprising of hundreds of thousands of Chinese citizens who attempted to uproot the
foreigners from their country once and for all. This uprising resulted in the slaughter of untold
numbers of Chinese citizens by the foreigners, thus crushing the rebellion fully and completely.
The failure of the Boxer Rebellion marked the end of thousands of years of dynastical rule in
China. Only afterwards did China take its first true steps into the modern world (Keay, 2011).
As China stumbled into this modern world, bereft of its four thousand year traditions,
Japan continued unabated its march toward empire building and the domination of East Asia.
During the late 1930’s the Japanese war machine poured into China, conquering large swaths of
land and committing unspeakable atrocities in the process. This second Sino-Japanese war
eventually spilled and merged into the broader Second World War with the surprise attack on
Pearl Harbor. For four years the United States battled the Empire until the cities of Nagasaki and
Hiroshima were consumed in two incandescent irradiated plumes. Devastated, the Japanese were
forced to sign unconditional surrender papers aboard the battleship Missouri. In an amazing echo
of history, the Japanese had returned to exactly where they started almost one hundred years
earlier: American warships in Tokyo Bay and a treaty which they were forced to sign. The
repercussions of Japan’s early 20th century aggressions, and the atrocities that accompanied
those aggressions, are still felt today: the United States is now firmly embedded in the entire
Asian-Pacific region, and Chinese enmity for the Japanese is, in some ways, more powerful
today than when the atrocities were first committed (Walker B., 2015).
Despite the end of the war in Asia, the violence was just beginning. The countries of
Southeast and East Asia were in a terrible state. Japan was in ruins, and the European colonizers
(such as the Dutch, the French, and the British) that still occupied the surrounding Asian
countries had been greatly weakened by the war. At that moment in history when European
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colonizers were at their weakest point, a zeitgeist of nationalism seized the imaginations of
colonized people all over world who had lived under colonialism for more than a hundred years.
Piggybacking these nationalistic independence movements, and sometimes driving them, was
Communism. The Cold War had come to Asia, and combined with a desire for independence
from colonial powers, war was soon to follow (Osborne, 2013).
These twin movements of nationalism and Communism forever reshaped the face of
Asia. Despite trying to stem the tide of history, European colonizers, such as the French and
Dutch, eventually lost control of their former colonial possessions after brief and fierce conflicts.
The United States did not object to these losses and was, in fact, a proponent of decolonization,
having granted its colonial possession, the Philippines, independence in 1948. However, the
Communist movements that were encroaching into Asia were viewed as a mortal threat to
American security and the established global order. Communist insurrections usually followed
the ouster of colonial occupiers, as internal factions within the host country battled over the
ideological future of their respective governments. The United States usually backed established
post-colonial governments throughout the region in their attempts to defeat Communist forces.
Yet by the mid 1950’s, Communist forces had made significant inroads into many different
countries of the Asia-Pacific region. Vietnam and Korea, hundreds of miles apart, had both been
split in two with Communist enclaves in the north of each country, and nationalist governments
in the south.
The United States was alarmed at these outcomes and feared that like dominos, the
countries of South East Asia would fall to Communism. With Korea and Vietnam fresh on the
minds of American strategists and military planners, it was clear that the spread of Communism
not only had to be stopped in Europe but in Asia as well. And just as in Europe, the Americans
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felt that the best way to stop the spread of Communism was through a military alliance (Fenton,
2012)
SEATO, or the South East Asian Treaty Organization, was the first Western-backed
military alliance that had been established in South East Asia. Like its European counterpart
NATO, SEATO was designed from the outset to stop the spread of Communism. Of the eight
nations that participated in SEATO, only two were actually in South East Asia. Nevertheless, the
pact members were committed to each other’s mutual defense in much the same way as were the
members of NATO. Yet, in addition to SEATO member states, so called “Protocol States” were
included under the pact’s defensive umbrella. These protocol states were comprised of the
countries that had been French Indochina (excepting North Vietnam). While the organization
was reasonably successful during its early years, it fell apart during the Vietnam War. The
Americans immediately wanted SEATO to intervene in South Vietnam during the outset of the
war to stop North Vietnam. However, despite being a protocol nation and falling under the
protection of SEATO, the French–as well as several other members–rejected the idea of giving
military support to the Vietnamese. Thus, the United States took unilateral action which
ultimately snowballed into the Vietnam War. Shortly thereafter, having failed in its mission and
composed of largely disinterested members, SEATO was dissolved. Certainly, any discussion
today of a modern alliance in East and South East Asia must include an analysis of the original
SEATO defense pact. But we must also remember that SEATO was Southeast Asian in name
only; the majority of its members were not even based in the region and, consequently, were not
interested in investing military power to protect the region (Fenton, 2012). But there is one
organization whose members are in Southeast Asia and whose original mission, like SEATO,
was to act as a bulwark against Communism.
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ASEAN, or the Association of South East Asian States, was originally conceived by
several Southeast Asian nations to help resist the spread of Communism. Yet, as Asia slowly
began to experience a Cold War thaw during the mid-to-late 1970’s, ASEAN quickly morphed
into an organization focused primarily on the economic growth of its member states. In many
ways, ASEAN, and its preoccupation with economic growth, served as a marker for a new era in
Asian history (ASEAN, 2016). Colonialism was in the rearview mirror and Communism would
continue to fade, becoming increasingly irrelevant.
Economic dynamism was now the name of the game, and many of the countries in the
region which had adopted capitalistic models for their economies began to see unprecedented
economic prosperity. Japan was the flagship of this movement, and its economy grew at a spellbinding pace. Though it had been left in ruins after war, a generation of Japanese rebuilt their
country, creating an “economic miracle” and dominating the Asian markets in the process. The
Japanese based their economy on an export model, whereby Japanese goods were exported to
more prosperous countries, such as the United States. But the Japanese were not the only players
in this new great game; several upstart nations, known as “Asian Tigers”, followed closely in
Japan’s footsteps. These countries also adopted export models and quickly ascended the ladder to
economic success. Today, these countries–among them, Taiwan and Singapore–maintain first
world economies and are leaders in technology, innovation and production (Kim, 1998). Yet,
notwithstanding the outstanding accomplishments of these countries, they are all eclipsed by the
unparalleled rise of one nation: China
As the second largest economy in the world, China is the economic behemoth of Asia
and, some believe, the driver of the world’s economy. But China obviously has not always held
this distinction. 40 years ago under the cultish and depraved leadership of Mao Zedong, China
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had become desperately impoverished, with a stagnating economy and a dirt-poor population.
However, in 1975 with the death of Mao, a new and rather unlikely leader came to the forefront.
Deng Xiaoping was something of a secularist when it came to Communist dogma. Deng believed
that China could only survive if it opened up to the West and embraced at least some aspects of
the market economy. This led him to take a utilitarian approach to the economy: it did not matter
what the label was on the economic system, what matter was that it worked. As he once
famously said “it does not matter if a cat is black or white. It only matters if it catches mice.”
And under Deng’s reforms, the Chinese economy would soon catch many “mice.” (Osnos,
2015).
The wider the Chinese markets opened, the more the country experienced a meteoric rise.
In fact, China became so open at one point that the Communist Party almost lost control. The
protests that erupted in China in 1989 had originally started as gatherings to mourn the death of
the moderate Communist Party member Hu Yaobang. These tributes, however, soon morphed
into full-blown calls for reform and even democracy. Initial government attempts to quell the
protests failed, leading to the ultimate decision on the part of the Party to violently suppress the
uprising. This action was a turning point in modern Chinese history. Though the protests had
been suppressed, the people were obviously unhappy with the state of their country. Thus, the
Communist leadership made a sort of grand bargain: they would provide the people with
economic growth in exchange for the people letting the party stay in power. And from that time
until now, this exchange has worked wonderfully (CFR, 2009).
Since 1978, China has experienced, on average, a ten percent growth in GDP year after
year. More than 800 million people have been raised out of poverty and the country’s entire
infrastructure has been rebuilt in just over 30 years. Based on the same export models that made
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other Asian countries so successful, China has become the so-called factory floor of the world.
China is the new economic miracle of Asia, and since admission to the World Trade
Organization in 2001, its growth has become even more meteoric (CFR, 2009). From an outside
perspective, this rise has been a peaceful one with no more than a few hiccups. But there have
been small, troubling, almost imperceptible actions taken by the Chinese government which,
combined with their military build-up, presents a disturbing pattern.
The Chinese economy is now undeniably slowing down, and it’s something that the
government is desperately trying to stop (BBC, 2016). With the lingering effects of the 2008
financial crisis, Chinese manufacturers have seen a slump in global demand. People either aren’t
buying anymore or are not buying as much. Factories have slowed production, or closed and
moved, and exports have fallen correspondingly. Also, China is not the once desperately poor
nation of yesteryear. As Chinese labor has become more productive, the cost of doing business in
China has risen, which, in turn, has also pushed manufacturing outside of the country (Smith N. ,
2016). Confronting this slowdown and drop in demand, the government has used virtually every
tool available to them.
Massive stimulus spending and infrastructure projects were initiated by the central as
well as local governments (Matthews, 2016). The currency has been purposely devalued in order
boost the attractiveness of exports (Smith C. , 2016). Chinese regulators even went so far as to
threaten prison for reporters who “spread rumors” about the falling Chinese stock market and
went on to blame “foreign forces” for manipulating the market (Yan, 2015). And these problems
have not abated. In the steel industry, for example, a business which is largely state-owned,
demand has fallen to all-time lows. But apparently, no one told the government. Chinese state
owned steel mills keep producing massive amounts of steel, far more than the market can absorb.
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Thus, prices and demand continue to fall while the factories continue to produce. The problem is
that the industry employs millions of Chinese workers, and slowing production would cause
severe social disruptions. Thus, the steel industry, and the economy as a whole, is stuck in a
cycle of over-production and under-demand (BBC, 2016). The Party is having more and more
trouble upholding its end of the power-for-prosperity bargain. In what is perhaps not a
coincidence, Chinese foreign policy in the South and East China Seas has become more
aggressive since the Chinese economy has fallen on hard times.
In just the past few years, China has begun a process of assertively pushing its claims to
the South China Sea. At first, it aggressively shadowed the naval, fishing, and oil exploration
vessels of neighboring nations and the United States. This, though, soon escalated into more
aggressive confrontations and attempts to disrupt the lawful activities of those vessels. In 2012,
China cut off access to Scarborough Shoal and did not allow Philippine vessels to enter. Seeking
to finally resolve the diplomatic dispute in the South China Sea, the Philippines filed a claim
with the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague in 2013 (AMTI, 2015). In the three year
span from the filing of that case to the decision, China brazenly defied international norms and
law, such as the United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty by constructing over half a dozen
artificial islands in disputed waters (CFR, 2016). These sandy monuments are a testament to
China’s determination to unilaterally lay claim to the South China Sea, and they have greatly
alarmed and upset the neighboring countries and opposing claimants. Entreaties have been made
by other nations, both inside and outside of the region, as well as organizations such as ASEAN,
to diplomatically resolve the crisis through a myriad of forums and summits. But China stands
steadfast in defiance, declaring its independence of all international norms and rules, and
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reasserting its supposed unassailable claim to the waters and geographic features of the South
China Sea (Phillips, 2016).
Though China has not yet expanded its island reclamation projects or declared a new air
defense zone, opposing claimants fear that just such a move is around the corner. Any such
provocation would bring us to a unique and dangerous point in history. China has always been a
great–or, at least a potentially great–Asian power. Mired in internal chaos and burdened by
external threats, China has never commanded the sort of power that regional neighbors such as
Japan have. But now after overcoming their Century of Humiliation, civil war, and Communist
misrule, an empowered China is transcending its historical limits and is going on the offensive.
Few nations resent the rise of China. In fact, China maintains trade relations with almost every
nation in the region. But the bold and unprecedented territorial expansion that China is currently
pursuing, is very troubling to its neighbors and trading partners in the region today.
Against this new 21st century hostility stands the entrenched older powers such as Japan
and the United States, both of which have held economic and military might in the region for
well over a century. Both China and the more established powers are now at loggerheads over
China’s aggression, and the future is uncertain at best. If the past is a prologue, China will almost
certainly keep pushing the literal boundaries in the South China Sea, despite the Permanent
Court’s recent decision in the Philippines vs. China (PCA, 2016). But how will its neighbors
respond? Current strategies for curtailing China’s aggression have fallen flat, so could a new
strategy be around the corner? Might nations opposed to China’s expansionism take a page from
European history and form a defensive military alliance such as an Asian NATO or a revived
SEATO? And if they do, what are the challenges inherent to forming such an organization? In
fact, the question of alliance building and balancing against rising powers is discussed at length
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by political scientists. These scholars have long debated the motivations for the aggression of
rising powers as well as the responses to such aggression by established or surrounding powers.
And perhaps no other theoretical school of thought is more concerned with or has better answers
to these questions than the school of Realism.
Theoretical Framework
Realism is a classic way of viewing the international order and community of states. The
tenets of Realism would have been very familiar to ancient scholars and were, in fact, taught by
the Greeks. This ancient view of international politics, known as Classical Realism, saw conflict
and power struggles in the world as a result of the corrupt nature of man. Yet, despite being the
grandfather of Realist thought, Classical Realism is not the only strain of Realist theory. On the
contrary, there are many different offshoots on the Realist theoretical tree. Even so, all Realist
theories and sub-theories share several core assumptions about the world and the politics within
it.
Modern day realism, often identified as Neo or Structural Realism, conceives the world
as an anarchical environment where each state seeks to maximize its power and security relative
to others. Unlike their Classical forbearers, Structural Realists see the conflicts and power
struggles of the world as not rooted in the nature of man, but rather in the structure of the
international system. It is the anarchy of this system or structure–the lack of any overarching
authority over states–that foments and causes conflict. In this anarchical world, the state alone is
the primary actor. The state has no higher power to appeal to, nor a “911” to call in case of an
emergency. Thus, it must be self-sufficient and rely only on its own abilities. In pursuit of this
self-sufficiency, states seek to maximize their power in order to be secure (Mearsheimer, 2001).
But how much power is enough? Here, there is a split among Realist theorists. Defensive
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Realists believe that states only seek as much power as is necessary to be secure (Waltz, 1979).
Offensive Realists, on the other hand, ridicule this idea. How much power is enough to be
secure? States, the Offensive Realists point out, cannot predict which other states will rise to
challenge them, and thus cannot accurately gauge how much power they will truly need to be
safe. Hence, the only way to be secure is to become a hegemonic nation, building the most
powerful state in the region (Mearsheimer, 2001). Potential hegemonic nations are also known as
revisionist powers in that they seek to change the established balance of power. Indeed, a
potential hegemon must be powerful enough to beat any and all states in its local region, though
not necessarily all at once. It is striking to note that this could well describe China. China
certainly is, as some have described it, “changing the facts on the ground.” (Haddick, 2014) That
is to say, through its construction of islands, declaration of air defense zones, aggressive military
posture, and massive build-up in military spending and capabilities, China is slowly but surely
becoming a regional hegemon. This, of course, is greatly upsetting the existing order and older
powers. To be sure, the rise of a potential hegemon is dangerous, but in one particular
environment it is especially dangerous.
Realists usually describe the world in terms of power distribution or polarization. In a bipolar world, such as existed in the Cold War, there are two predominant great powers. This
global environment is considered by many Realist thinkers to be the most stable and peaceful
distribution of power. But a more unstable distribution of power is a multi-polar world. Here,
there are multiple great powers, all distrustful of each other and seeking to maximize their own
individual security. Multi-polar worlds are more dangerous because the possibility of
miscommunication, or the likelihood of an accident, occurring between two or more of the
powers increases significantly. Into this mix, a potential hegemon can be very dangerous
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(Mearsheimer, 2001). Although the world has been described as unipolar with the United States
as the sole super power (Mowle, 2007), that view seems to be fading into obsolescence
(Burrows, 2016). Burdened by financial crisis at home and wars abroad, the United States is not
quite as powerful as it once was. Nor are its enemies and rivals as weak as they once were. Thus,
the rise of China as a potential hegemon is especially concerning considering that the power
arrangement in the world is increasingly multi-polar. But how will the other powers in this multipolar world react to a potential hegemon?
Faced with the prospect of a rising and powerful potential hegemon, states have several
options. They can pass the buck to another state, hoping that that state will deal with the
hegemon; they can band wagon with the rising hegemon and simply join them; or, they can
balance against the rising hegemon by banding together and forming an alliance (Walt, 1987).
China, seeking to control both the East and South China Seas, threatens almost every one of its
neighbors in the region. Thus, passing the buck would do none of these powers any good as it
would not solve their direct individual conflicts with China. Bandwagoning, while initially
seeming like an option, is, in fact, highly unlikely. As some Defensive Realists explain, nations
almost always choose to balance rising powers rather than acquiesce. In fact, the more aggressive
a rising state is and, paradoxically, the more powerful it is, the more likely the other powers will
balance against it. This is true even for weaker states facing the hegemon if those states can
balance with more powerful states against the hegemon (Walt, 1987). In Asia, we see just such a
scenario.
China has proven to be an aggressive and powerful rising hegemon, but it is rising into a
world already populated by powerful states. In the East and South China Seas, the theoretical
expectation, given what we know, would be for the states surrounding China to balance and ally
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themselves against China. But Realists caution that all alliances are, at best, only temporary
marriages, entered into out of convenience and lasting only so long as the threat does
(Mearsheimer, 2001). Additionally, some scholars have theorized that balancing is only the
initial response to a rising hegemon. Eventually, they argue, if a rising hegemon continues to
accumulate ever more power, it will make balancing ineffective and attract to itself all who
initially opposed it, causing them to finally bandwagon with the hegemonic state (Fiammenghi,
2011). While this may be true in the long-run, balancing may still be the best choice at this point
in the history of the Asian–Pacific region. But how will the global power scales be balanced?
Would an Asian-NATO alliance be best way to offset the aggressive, hegemonic-like rise of
China, or would an already existing organization accomplish the same thing? Modern scholars
are divided over the solutions to the present diplomatic crisis in the South China Sea, and thus, it
is best to cover a range of opinions. First, we will look at NATO as a possible balancer to China
and how scholars view NATO’s role in the Asia-Pacific Region and the conflict that is brewing
there. Next, we will review a host of other scholars who believe that ASEAN is the solution for
resolving disputes between China and its neighbors. Finally, we will see how, in the absence of
ASEAN, many scholars have called for the United States to balance the power scales in Asia.

Literature Review
When discussing alliances and balancing, it is instructive to first look at current
discussions surrounding NATO. Some Regime theorist scholars have described NATO, and
alliances in general as promoters of common national values. But other more Realist scholars
counter this idea, and believe that NATO’s members adhere to a more Realist ideology. Alliance
members, they assert, only because it benefits their respective countries. Alliances, they believe,
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are inherently self-centered (Duffield, 1995). Others echo this sentiment by explaining that most
NATO members join the alliance simply so they can pass the buck on defense (Thies, 2003).
Turning to Asia, and NATO’s involvement there (or lack of it), some writers have explained that
NATO has remained aloof from Asia because NATO members traditionally viewed the Asian
world as backwards (Hemmer, 2002). Others explain that the absence of NATO from Asia is due
to the traditionally low threat environment in Asia and the prioritization of Europe (Kai, 2012).
On the other hand, some have reported that NATO is now seeking to become embedded in the
region (Bagbaslioglu, 2014). But this idea is largely a minority view and is countered by experts
who argues that NATO does not wish to expand outside of Europe (Fallon, 2013). In the absence
of NATO filling the alliance gap in Asia, and balancing against China, some have looked to
regional multilateral economic cooperation organizations to do so.
The ASEAN View
Perhaps the most prominent of the multilateral, Asian-based organizations, is the
Association of South East Asian States (ASEAN). Although ASEAN is primarily an
organization with economic centered goals, it does have a history of resolving diplomatic
disputes in the region. This is a tradition that some scholars hope to build upon by promoting
ASEAN as the primary arbiter for the South China Sea, and the solution to ongoing diplomatic
disputes.
ASEAN, as some Liberal theoretical scholars point out, has an unparalleled history of
solving diplomatic disputes in the Southeast Asian region. ASEAN, in and of itself, represents a
tremendous diplomatic accomplishment. ASEAN, through its legal mechanisms and various
treaties, has linked together the entire Southeast Asian region through economic integration.
With these accomplishments in mind, many argue that ASEAN is still the best way to resolve
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current diplomatic disputes in the South China Sea (Oegroseno, 2013). This view is backed up
by other scholars who remind readers that ASEAN has not only been involved in resolving
disagreements among its own members, but has, in fact, been a key arbiter in the South China
Sea dispute for several decades (Thayer, 2013). Furthermore, during that time, ASEAN ensured
that a peaceful status quo was maintained in the South China Sea (Weissman, 2010). In an effort
to promote continued cooperation in the region, some scholars suggest that more meaningful
ASEAN–Chinese relations should be pursued through joint cooperation in energy transportation
and exploration (Hong, 2010). Others seek to strengthen the ASEAN–Chinese relationship
through already existing Chinese bi-lateral ties with various ASEAN member countries (Limsira,
2014). Still more believe that common environmental goals would do much to deepen the
ASEAN–Chinese working relationship (Borchers, 2014). But just as many scholars are
optimistic about ASEAN’s role in solving regional disputes, many others, are very skeptical.
Returning to Realist thought, some scholars note that, while ASEAN solved the VietnamCambodia crisis during the 1970’s, today, ASEAN’s regional forums and dialogues have done
little to promote collective security (Evans, 2001). This analysis is supported by other authors
who explain that, in the shadow of a rising China, ASEAN is being pulled at the seams. Each
member is being forced to decide whether or not it is on China’s side (Seng, 2015). This
pessimistic view is echoed by many other authors. ASEAN, as well as the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), has been essentially unwilling, when asked by the United
States, to confront the growing security challenges of the region (Schmitt, 2006). This, despite
the United States’ attempt to elevate ASEAN as a key diplomatic forum for the ongoing South
China Sea negotiations (Simon, 2016). In the absence of a regional organization taking charge of
security matters, some have suggested a “concert of powers” to address the security concerns of
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Asia. (Capie, 2002). But in light of ASEAN’s failure to resolve the crisis and provide solutions,
others have promoted the idea that regionalism and cooperation in Asia are not at all realistic
(Nair, 2008). This is due, some argue, to the fact that China continually obstructs multilateralism
and regional dialogue (Rozman, 2011). A growing chorus of scholars believe that, not only is
ASEAN incapable of solving the present regional dispute, but is, in fact, being torn apart by it.
Many writers who are more aligned with a Realist theoretical perspective believe that the
diplomatic disputes of the South China Sea, as well as China’s aggressive actions there, are
pulling at the seams of ASEAN and straining the internal relations of its member states. ASEAN,
as one scholar has noted, initially sought to develop close ties to both China and the United
States in order to benefit the organization. Unfortunately, the power play between China and the
United States, and the dispute in the South China Sea, has driven member states to focus more on
national priorities rather than multilateralism and the goals of ASEAN (Jagtiani, 2013). Others
single out China’s aggression, in particular, as a serious threat to the health and stability of
ASEAN (Thayer, 2016b). In this tempestuous environment, some question whether ASEAN will
be able to cope with the changing geopolitical environment (Beeson, 2016). Others simply state
that in light of China’s rise and the United States’ strategic focus on the Asian-Pacific region,
efforts to promote multilateralism will ultimately fail (Dalpino, 2013).
As we have seen from previous sections, ASEAN seems increasingly unwilling to
confront China over illegal territorial acquisitions and its aggressive actions in the South China
Sea. This is a fact which has not escaped current scholars, whose tide of opinion seems to have
turned in favor of an increasingly pessimistic view of ASEAN’s future role in the ongoing
disputes. In the vacuum left by ASEAN, a growing body of experts are looking to the United
States to confront China. However, not everyone agrees on how, exactly, this is to be done.
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De-emphasizing the United States
Some put forth the idea that the United States should focus on more regional ties and
downplay its bilateral security agreements with nations such as Japan. Containment should not
be the objective. Instead, the US should take part in talks such as the East Asia Summit (EAS)
and the Asian Pacific Community (APC). And while not advocating ASEAN and APEC, these
thinkers still see multilateralism, with a de-emphasis on China, as the key (TOW, 2009). Others
take a similar stance. The United States’ bilateral partners, they assert, should have more
diplomatic autonomy and not be constrained by the United States. Thus, any alliance with the US
should be a loose one (Koga, 2011). But many other scholars are totally opposed to this school of
thought. They argue for more collective security, especially in light of the rise of China (Rolfe,
2008). Some authors go so far as to label China a hegemonic power. Also, perhaps predictably,
these same writers emphasize the critical importance of the United States’ bilateral security
agreements in the region (Navarro, 2015). Others, nevertheless, see the United States’ bilateral
agreements with regional individual nations as fomenting a security dilemma. They theorize that
an increasing military presence will spur nations such as China to, in turn, adopt more aggressive
postures and accumulate more weapons (Park, 2011) . But other authors argue that it is the other
way around; that it is China that is creating an arms race and the resulting panic. Bilateral and
multilateral security agreements, for example, have increased as a response to China and its
actions (Bisley, 2012). This is demonstrated through a new bilateral security agreement between
Japan and Australia, one of many new security arrangements spurred by China’s aggressive
actions (Weeks, 2011). Finally, some scholars come close to advocating for a regional defense
pact by arguing for the strengthening of the hub and spoke system of alliances. In this model, the
United States is the hub and each of its bilateral defense agreements is a spoke. It is argued that
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the spokes need to become a web in order to strengthen the existing defense arrangement. Like
an alliance, each member would be committed to the other (Blair, 2001).
Emphasizing the United States
This strengthening of alliances is seen by many scholars as an attempt by the United
States to contain the rising China. Saying just that, one author, who adopts a Realist theoretical
outlook, makes the case that the United States is pursuing an obvious containment policy through
its strengthening of ties with traditional Asian-Pacific allies while forging new bonds in the
region and attempting to limit the economic influence of China (Wong, 2014). Others have come
to much the same conclusion, stating that the United States’ new “Pivot to Asia” policy is a tacit
attempt to preserve American hegemony. However, the strengthening of ties to traditional allies
in the region could precipitate greater military competition between the US and China
(Lofflmann, 2016). It has also been noted by some Realists that in the process of this rebalancing
to Asia, NATO will likely become more and more irrelevant as interests diverge (Maher, 2016).
In light of the decline of NATO, Japan, in particular, is seen as a key US regional ally. The
United States and Japan are moving closer together as allies, just as China has strengthened ties
to North Korea (Goo, 2014). But some Realist scholars are bullish on NATO, predicting that its
ties to Japan will become stronger even though Asia is outside of NATO’s scope and Japan is
constitutionally limited to its immediate region in terms of military projection (Scott, 2016).
Using Power Transition theory, Kelly predicts that if the United States, along with its allies, were
to balance the rise of China, it would reap enormous benefits from such a strategy as opposed to
its more recent record of intervention (Kelly R., 2015). Other scholars argue for a more veiled
approach to containment, and thus call for a soft balancing whereby the US strengthens its allies
(Burgess, 2016). But this conservative strategy is not shared by everyone. One author takes an
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especially hard tone, condemning the United States’ 30-year economic engagement with China
as a failed policy, and calling on the United States to greatly expand its naval presence in Asia as
well as limiting trade with China (Friedberg, 2012). Not all scholars believe in outright
containment, however. Tellis uses contemporary growth theory to emphasize that economic
interdependence makes traditional containment impossible (Tellis, 2013).
On the flip side of the coin, several recent academics and experts are noting the closer
ties that China has with Russia and the possibility that China could be forming its own alliances.
Some focus on China’s increasingly close relationships to Iran and Pakistan, relationships which
strengthen its position in broader Asia and the Indian Ocean (Khan, 2014). Others show that
although Russia and China are pulled in separate directions at times, they still maintain a strong
relationship (Russett, 1998). A relationship which is being strengthened by nuclear proliferation
in North Korea and the United States’ positioning of anti-ballistic missile technology in the
South (Bin, 2016).
It seems that the vast majority of scholars have passed over the concept of an AsianPacific NATO-type alliance as a means to balance the rise of China. Some focus on regional
solutions from organizations such as ASEAN. But, despite its past successes, ASEAN seems
increasingly unable or unwilling to confront China or effectively resolve the burgeoning crisis.
This is a reality that is increasingly reflected in the literature. Scholars seem to be pessimistic
that any ASEAN led initiative will solve the crisis. With a dearth of leadership from ASEAN,
others are looking to the United States to serve as the balancing agent. Within this camp, some
advocate a cautious approach. They call for a strategy which would take great pains to avoid
provoking China in any way or upsetting the current status quo. Others favor a more aggressive
approach and advocate a strengthening of US bilateral alliances. But few if any promote a
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NATO-type organization as the solution to the Asian-Pacific region’s problems. This paper will
attempt the fill that gap in the literature. We will delve into the various problems that the
founders of a hypothetical Asian-Pacific NATO would confront in building the new
organization. Yet, before we examine the specific challenges to forming an Asian-Pacific
NATO, we will first lay out a road map for the proceeding discussion.
Methodology
To start, we will define some of our terms and concepts. “Asian-Pacific NATO” or
“Asian-Pacific alliance” shall refer mainly to potential member nations, excluding China, that
ring the East and South China Seas. These could include Vietnam, the Philippines, Japan,
Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Even countries on the periphery of that region,
such as Australia and India, could be included due to their interaction with the regional and
territorial conflicts with China. Without a doubt, the United States, which was central to the
original European NATO would, likewise, be a central player of any Asian-Pacific NATO. Of
course, this is not to say that all these nations would or could make up an Asian-Pacific NATO.
Some may be much more inclined to join than others. But considering that China has conflicts
with almost every nation in the region, it is not outside the realm of possibility that all could join
together. For our purposes, “alliance” will refer to a military alliance similar to NATO. While
NATO’s scope and mission has expanded somewhat in recent years, this paper will model the
hypothetical Asian-Pacific NATO after the earliest incarnation of NATO. The original mission
of NATO was to confront and defend against the Soviet Union, and best fits the mission of our
Asian-Pacific NATO, namely to confront China. Like the original European NATO, each
member of an Asian-Pacific NATO would be treaty-bound to provide aid to any other member
whose territory is attacked or invaded. Also, all members’ military forces would be standardized
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in order to forge a common fighting force in much the same way that NATO operates. All data
used within this thesis will be draw from historical sources and books, as well as contemporary
news articles.
The theoretical bedrock of this paper will rest on the foundation of Structural Realism. As
discussed above, Structural Realism perceives the world as an anarchic environment where each
state is distrustful of its neighbors. In this environment, each state seeks to expand its power in
an attempt to balance against potentially hostile neighbors. As we have seen, states can cooperate
with each other by forming military alliances in order to balance against larger more powerful
states. The purpose of an Asian-Pacific NATO would be to balance against the rise of China.
Balancing is a theoretical concern of Realists, some of whom advocate alliances in order to
achieve balance against a rising hegemon. Thus, the basis for an Asian-Pacific NATO is found,
first and foremost, in Structural Realist Theory. Realists ground this state-to-state cooperation by
reminding us that alliances are only ever “temporary marriages of convenience.” Thus, while
military alliances require and promote cooperation between nations, this cooperation is in the
best interest of the state.
The methodology of this thesis will utilize a comparison/contrast method in order to
better understand the challenges facing a hypothetical Asian-Pacific NATO. The thesis will
compare and contrast the original European NATO with our 21st century hypothetical AsianPacific NATO. Looking back in time to the original European NATO, we will briefly examine
some of the various challenges that faced the planners and commanders of that organization.
Then, we will look at the potential challenges that could be faced by an Asian-Pacific NATO
organization. How did the original NATO confront and solve the challenges which it faced? Are
there similarities in the types of challenges both organizations faced and could face? Comparing
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and contrasting both of the alliances will give us insight into what kind of challenges a realworld Asian-Pacific NATO might face and how it could solve them. However, besides simply
comparing challenges that both have faced, we will draw out an overall pattern or similarity that
makes sense of both alliances’ challenges and solutions. This synthesis will be the conclusion of
our paper.
A comparison/contrast paper has many inherent strengths. For one, it can make certain
qualities visible that are common to both alliances which would be otherwise invisible. Also, a
clearer picture of one alliance can be obtained by comparing it with the other. However there are
also several distinct disadvantages to a comparison/contrast method. First, the two units being
compared may not be truly equivalent. The original NATO was located in Europe while an
Asian-Pacific NATO would be located within the Asia-Pacific region. While both organizations
are defense pacts, the differences between regions may make any comparison difficult. We are
also constrained by a limited number of cases. While there have been other military defense
alliances such as SEATO and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), the only surviving
alliance today, and the only one being used for this paper, is NATO. Thus, since our cases are
limited to two, comparing and contrasting our hypothetical Asian-Pacific NATO with the
original NATO limits the conclusions that we can draw. Finally, we must be aware of Galton’s
Problem. Simply put, it may be that the two organizations are not at all separate, but are, in fact,
constituent parts of a whole. It may be, for instance, that both of the alliances we are evaluating
are nothing more than tools or extensions of the United States government. The United States,
for example, already plays an outsized role in the original NATO and would, undoubtedly, play a
large role in an Asian-Pacific NATO. Thus, we may be comparing two things that are not
separate at all. Keeping these limitations in mind, we still believe that comparison contrast is an
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appropriate and useful method for this thesis. Despite its flaws, comparison/contrast provides us
with the ability to draw new conclusions from separate cases. Or, in this case,
comparison/contrast allows us to speculate and draw conclusions about a non-existent alliance by
comparing it to one which already exists.
The remaining portion of this paper will be devoted to the examination of several of the
potential challenges that would need to be remedied before any Asian-Pacific NATO alliance
could ever be formed. Following the examination of challenges we will then look at potential
solutions to those challenges. First, before we look at solutions for our future Asian-Pacific
NATO, we will return to the original European NATO, to see how that alliance solved the
challenges with which it was confronted. Then we will see how the potential challenges facing
an Asian-Pacific NATO could be solved. Following this section, we will analyze both alliances
in order to examine the similarities and differences while offering several policy
recommendations. Finally we will conclude our paper by reviewing what we have learned and
noting any limitations to our study. Hopefully, this study will add to the admittedly small but,
nevertheless, vital discussion of the possibility of creating a military alliance in East and
Southeast Asia.

34

CHAPTER II: THE CHALLENGES
In the following chapter we will examine several common challenges that both the
original NATO faced and our hypothetical Asian-Pacific NATO may face. Both faced and face
the challenge of justifying their very existence. In other words, why were and are they needed?
Secondly, the original NATO was faced with the difficult but necessary challenge of admitting a
very controversial member to the defense pact. Likewise, an Asian-Pacific NATO would be
faced with necessity of including a certain member who would be very controversial to the
region. Third, alliances can be expensive, and figuring out how to pay for them is an ever-present
challenge. Fourth, the original NATO was faced with several territorial challenges. However,
nothing faced by NATO can compare to the unprecedented and complicated territorial disputes
with which an Asian-Pacific NATO would have to contend. Finally, the original NATO was
faced with the prospect of blowback, or consequences for its actions. Similarly, an Asian-Pacific
NATO would have to tread a fine line to avoid significant blowback from its actions.
Old NATO, Old Challenges
The prospect of building a new alliance is a daunting one, though it has been done before.
Yet just like today, the planners and commanders of the original European NATO faced many
different challenges. And in order to compare and contrast the new with the old, we need to go
briefly back in time and touch on the myriad of challenges that the original NATO faced.
One of the most fundamental challenges faced by the original NATO was justifying the
very reason for its existence. Prior to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
the Treaty of Brussels was a defensive alliance which had been signed by several Western
European nations. Similar to NATO, the Treaty of Brussels was a defense pact which guaranteed
that the respective members of the pact would come to each other’s mutual aid and defense
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should a war break out. Thus, in light of that treaty, it was more than fair to question the very
need for the subsequent formation of NATO. However, once NATO was formed, it faced
another, seemingly greater, problem. NATO needed more soldiers. Yet the only way to obtain
them was to add a new–and very controversial–member. West Germany had the troops that
NATO desperately needed if it was to secure the continent against Soviet incursions. But many
members, and even the Soviet Union, objected to Germany’s inclusion. If it included the German
forces, NATO risked alienating members and adversaries alike (Gaddis, 1998).
Another challenge that NATO members faced during the Cold War was paying for the
astronomical cost of maintaining their respective militaries. Each member was, and is, required
to spend a minimum amount of GDP on defense. However, these cost were often heavy and this
proved to be a perennial challenge for the military alliance. Not only did alliance members have
to maintain their militaries, they had to continually improve them to stay ahead of Soviet
advances. Throughout the long standoff between the Soviet Union and NATO, there also arose
several territorial challenges that had to be resolved peacefully. In fact, during the Cuban Missile
Crisis, the territorial integrity and security of both NATO and the Soviet Union were challenged.
Finally, NATO had to face the challenge of “blowback.” Some of the actions that the European
NATO defense pact took were controversial, and there was always the possibility that the Soviet
Union would respond dangerously to the strategies or programs enacted by the alliance. One of
the primary concerns of the defense pact was to minimize these negative reactions and responses
and thus minimize the probability of war (Gaddis, 1998).
These challenges, while significant, were all solved by the original European NATO.
And while an Asian-Pacific NATO has not yet been formed, it would undoubtedly face many

36

challenges of its own. Some of these new challenges are similar to the original NATO’s
challenges while others are entirely new.
Challenges of a 21st Century Asian Pacific NATO
NATO was faced with many challenges, however, they are not at all dissimilar from
those that an Asian-Pacific NATO could face. Both have to justify their existence, and include
controversial members. Furthermore, both have to contend with large defense spending costs.
Also, both organizations faced the very real prospect and consequences of blowback. However,
when looking to territorial disputes, it is clear that the original NATO never faced the kind of
complex territorial disputes that an Asian-Pacific NATO would face.
The assumptions behind these hypothetical challenges for a 21st Century Asian-Pacific
NATO are firmly rooted in Structural Realist theory. For one, the examination of the need for an
alliance is rooted in the Structural Realist assumption that, in the face of a rising power, alliances
will form to balance that power. Secondly, the study of the constraints which could prevent
Japan from joining an Asian-Pacific alliance reflects the Structural Realist idea that nations are
suspicious of their neighbors. Given recent history, Japan’s neighbors are especially suspicious
of that nation. Thirdly, in the world of a Structural Realist, nations continually attempt to
increase their power relative to other states. However, how will the nations of an Asian-NATO,
and especially the United States, afford this additional security? Moving to the theoretical
justification for our fourth hypothetical challenge, we recognize the Realist assumption that
nations–being suspicious of their neighbors–will jealously guard their territory. But in the
complex environment of the South China Sea, what territory would an Asian-Pacific NATO
actually defend? Finally, the risk of Blow Back, or a disproportionate response by the Chinese to
the creation of an Asian-Pacific NATO, reflects the Structural Realist fear of security dilemmas.
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Security dilemmas occur when the actions by one state, or group of states, to enhance security,
precipitates a similar response by opposing states. In the case of an Asian-Pacific alliance, it may
be that the creation of such an organization would spur the Chinese to create a similar
organization or take other steps to further enhance their security. With our challenges anchored
in Structural Realist theory, we can now move on to examining the challenges themselves.

Challenge #1: Hub and Spoke Sufficiency
One of the first questions that should be asked when constructing an Asian-Pacific
alliance, is whether or not it is even needed. In fact, the United States already has an impressive
collection of alliances in the Asia-Pacific region. But, it was not always this way. In the
formative years of the United States, the founding fathers continuously warned against so-called
entangling alliances. In his inaugural address, Thomas Jefferson declared that the United States
ought to have “peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances
with none.” Washington had preceded this credo with his admonition against “permanent
alliances.” This diplomatic philosophy was adhered to by the United States until the end of the
Second World War when Soviet expansionism prompted the creation of NATO. And while
NATO may have arguably been the first major “entangling alliance” the United States entered
into, it was certainly not to be the last.
Today, the United States maintains more defense-related treaty obligations than any other
country in the world. By some estimates, depending on which treaties and obligations are
counted, the United States is bound to protect more than a quarter of humanity. That’s about 69
nations in all, representing more than 75 percent of all global economic output (Taylor, 2015a).
In fact, in recent years, the commitments of the United States have only continued to expand as
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new nations have joined NATO (Taylor, 2015b). This tremendous commitment is the aggregate
of a myriad of defense pacts and bilateral defense agreements. Almost without a doubt, the most
important of these commitments to date is NATO. Other treaties include the Rio Pact and
ANZUS or the Australia, New Zealand, United States, Security Treaty. Yet in East and Southeast
Asia, with the exception of ANZUS, the United States does not participate in any overarching
security organization. Instead, the United States maintains a “hub and spoke” system of bilateral
defense treaties with many nations in the region. In this hub and spoke system, the United States
is the “hub” while each country that it maintains a defense treaty with is a “spoke.” Thus, if one
nation is attacked (Japan, for example), there would be no regional response of treaty-bound
nations to respond such to such an event, as is true in Europe. Instead, it would most likely be the
United States alone that would come to its aid. Thus, in the wake of the failure of SEATO, the
hub and spoke system has functioned as a sort of alliance system in Asia without any of the
attendant benefits or liabilities of such an alliance. In East and Southeast Asia, there are three
main or major countries, or “spokes”, with which the United States maintains official defense
pacts: the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea (Navarro, 2015).
In 1951 the United States signed a mutual defense treaty with the Philippines whereby
each signatory promised to aid the other in a time of war. The Philippines proved to be a vital
ally throughout the Cold War, as it provided key military bases for US forces. But following the
end of the half century-long US-Soviet standoff in 1991, the Philippines decided to eject all
American military forces from the Philippines. The massive and strategic Subic Bay naval base,
where US naval ships were repaired and replenished, was ultimately closed as well as Clark Air
Force Base (Francia, 2013). At the time, this may have seemed an inconsequential decision for
the Philippines, but almost immediately, the Chinese began to slowly encroach on Philippine
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territory (Baltimore Sun, 1995). Over the coming two decades the Philippines found itself in an
increasingly dangerous diplomatic dispute with China. The Chinese effectively seized
Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines in 2012 which, among other actions, led to the
Philippines’ filing a case with the Permanent Court (AMTI, 2015). Interestingly, although falling
under Philippine sovereignty according to international law, and despite still maintaining a
defense treaty with the United States, the United States, in fact, did nothing to stop the Chinese
from seizing the shoal. This move has been criticized by some; however the United States may
have simply been caught off guard (Chang, 2013). In any case, reports indicate that the United
States has been in contact with China, warning them to not construct any artificial islands on the
shoal (McDevitt, 2016). With the United States’ and Philippine’s defense treaty on shaky
ground, and perhaps with the intention to send a message to China, the two nations reaffirmed
their bilateral defense treaty in 2014 (Heydarian, 2016). This move is expected to strengthen ties
between the two countries and will once again allow the United States limited access to
Philippines bases and thus ensure an American presence in the region. But with these renewed
privileges, the United States is also inheriting a Philippine conflict. With Scarborough Shoal in
the hands of the Chinese, the United States may be called upon to intervene in any escalation of
Chinese-Philippine relations. Worse yet, the Philippines could do little else to aid the United
States in such a conflict outside of providing bases. The Philippines hardy has a navy to speak of
and is armed with an underfunded and poorly trained army (Parameswaran, 2015). The treaty
between the United States and the Philippines may be bilateral, but for all intents and purposes, it
is one way. Yet, the Philippines is only one of many regional states to which the US is linked by
treaty.
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Japan is one of the biggest, and in many ways, most important US military partners in the
Asia-Pacific region. With over 109 bases and 50,000 troops stationed in the country, the US
maintains a significant presence in that country. Japan also hosts several important naval bases
outside of the US, making it a strategically vital ally. But the path to vital ally was not an easy
one for Japan. After the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the United States waged a bitter war with the
Empire of Japan until Japanese leadership finally capitulated. But, just as in Europe, the end of
the Second World War ushered in the beginning of the Cold War. Unwilling to let the Soviets
obtain a foothold in Japan or in the rest of Asia, the United States established a massive military
presence on the islands of Japan. During the Korean and Vietnam Wars and all throughout the
Cold War Era, Japan has been the mainstay ally of the United States in Asia (Dian, 2014).
However, this special relationship has not come without bumps in the road.
From time to time, pacifistic elements of Japanese society have demanded the ouster of
American forces from Japan. Sometimes, these demands are based on the disruptions to local
communities caused by US military bases, and other times the demands come as a response to
crimes committed by US personnel. Even the alleged presence of nuclear weapons has helped to
anti-US sentiment from time to time. During the 2009 Japanese election cycle and the resulting
electoral victory of the Democratic Party of Japan, it seemed that US-Japanese relations were
going to take a turn for the worse. DPJ wanted to distance itself from the United States while
moving closer to China. However, the implementation of DPJ’s vision was flawed and shortlived. Following aggressive Chinese actions in the South China Sea, the opposing Liberal
Democratic Party, or LDP, which has been the most powerful party during most of Japan’s
democratic history, defeated the DPJ and elected Shinzo Abe as Prime Minister of Japan (Dian,
2014).
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Abe has taken a bold and more nationalistic approach to governing Japan. Faced with a
flagging economy and an aggressive Chinese neighbor, Japan has drifted from its pacifist roots
and restrained foreign policy. In addition, Abe has made it clear that the Japanese-US
relationship is vital to Japanese security in the 21st century. In fact, Abe has increased military
spending and has even bent the rules of Japan’s pacifistic constitution to ensure that Japanese
troops could assist allies outside of Japan. Unlike their Philippine counterparts, the Japanese
have a robust economy and a relatively powerful military, considering the restrictions placed on
it. Abe’s more strident, militaristic style is largely a response to increasingly aggressive actions
by Chinese military and naval forces in and around disputed islands in the East China Sea
(Hughes, 2015). Thus, like the Philippines, volatile times have pushed the United States and
Japan closer together, strengthening their special relationship and banishing any thought of
separation.
Finally, the last of the United States’ three main bilateral allies in the region is South
Korea. With the end of the Korean War, and the permanent separation of North and South Korea,
the United States signed a mutual defense pact with South Korea. As with the other defense pacts
signed by the United States, the Korean defense pact provided the United States yet another
strategic outpost in Asia. However, unlike the Philippines or Japan, South Korea has technically
been in a state of war for more than 60 years. Miles away from the capital city of Seoul lies the
demilitarized border with North Korea. North Korea has proved to be a dangerous neighbor, and
one against which the South Koreans must constantly defend themselves. Despite the end of
hostilities for more than half a century, the two countries have almost gone to war multiple times
within the last several years. It is here, in this nation, that the United States’ defense pact may
end up meaning more than almost any other pact in the region. With more than 30,000 US
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soldiers ready to defend South Korea, the United States could very well be pulled into a war by
the unpredictable actions of North Korea. Yet, despite being threatened by North Korea, South
Korea has not yet had to face down an aggressive China. Unlike Japan or the Philippines, South
Korea has only very minor territorial disputes with China, none of which have escalated in any
appreciable way. However, North Korea has historically been influenced by China, one of the
few countries willing to trade with them. And, depending on the continuing depth of this
relationship between the two nominally Communist powers, South Korea may or may not find
itself at odds with China. While the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea represent the most
sizable defensive partners in the region, they are not the only spokes connected to the hub of the
United States (Oberdorfer, 2013).
The Republic of China, now more commonly known as Taiwan, once maintained an
official defense pact with the United States like Japan and South Korea. However, during the
1970’s the United States normalized relations with the Communist mainland China, and in a
diplomatic move, ended the defense treaty with Taiwan. This does not mean though that the
United States does not maintain a military relationship with the island nation, nor does it mean
that the US would not defend it. In 1996, following threatening Chinese actions directed against
Taiwan, the United States sent a resoundingly clear message that it would protect Taiwanese
sovereignty, sending several aircraft carrier groups to prowl the Taiwan Strait in a clear show of
force. Continuing this commitment, the United States recently approved an almost two billion
dollar arms sale–over the objections of the Chinese–to the military of Taiwan (Bush, 2015).
Australia, too, is another spoke in the United States Asian-Pacific hub and has been since the
enactment of the ANZUS treaty (Donnini, 1991). In fact, the spoke system maintained by the
United States only seems to be adding more spokes. Vietnam, while not a country protected by
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the United States, now enjoys US arms deals like its neighbors, thanks to the rescinding of a
thirty-plus year arms embargo (Harris, 2016). Thus, while not all spokes are equal, the
combination of them represents a significant de facto military alliance. But is it as effective as an
actual military alliance? Does it fill the role of an Asian-Pacific NATO?
As we have seen, many experts and scholars suggest that the most effective way for the
United States to deal with China is to continue to strengthen and support its allies in the AsiaPacific region. Indeed, China’s actions have driven America’s allies and even former enemies
into America’s arms. China is quickly becoming a threat similar to what the Soviet Union was
during the Cold War. An external threat, a glue that holds together allies and drives nations into
the arms of the United States. But is this hub and spoke system enough? Returning to Realist
theory and our primary concern, is the hub and spoke system enough to balance the rise of
China, or is a more traditional, NATO-type alliance needed? Overcoming the argument for the
sufficiency of the Hub and Spoke system, and effectively arguing its insufficiency, is only one of
the many challenges faced by those who would create an Asian NATO.
Challenge #2: The Tale of Two Yurei, or the Tale of Two Ghosts
If an Asian alliance were to ever become a reality, one nation–outside of the United
States–would be vital to its success, and that nation is Japan. However, there are several serious
barriers to this admission. As a populous, economically strong and technologically advanced
nation, Japan is certainly the strongest of the “spokes” and would be the backbone of any
potential Asian-Pacific NATO. Without Japan, any serious balancing attempt against China,
would not be feasible. Japan has the third largest nominal GDP in the world, producing over four
trillion dollars in goods and services. Japan is also a global leader in technology and advanced
manufacturing, as well as home to some of the most prosperous companies on the planet.
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Mitsubishi, Toyota, and Toshiba are only a few of the world leaders in manufacturing and
technology (CIA, 2016). But despite all of its tremendous success, Japan is haunted by two
Yurei, two ghosts from the past that could prevent it from ever taking part in an Asian-Pacific
alliance. The first of these specters is Japan’s military, or rather the constitutional limits put on it.
The second, is the persistent legacy of Japan’s past war crimes.
Japan’s power not only resides in its robust economy but in its powerful military as well.
Japan ranks eighth globally in military spending, a sum which has provided the state with the
tenth most powerful military in the world (Macias, 2014). This typically conservative, postWorld War II force, has begun in recent years to stretch the limits of its pacifistic constitution.
For example, prohibitions on exports were recently lifted, allowing the once-isolated Japanese
military industrial complex to begin to spread its wings. Pushing back against the rise of China
and perhaps seeking to play a larger role in the region, the Japanese are beginning to sell
weapons and military systems to their neighbors, bolstering regional defense and, in the process,
strengthening their bilateral ties.
Japanese patrol boats have been sold to the Philippines and Vietnam, while Japanese
submarines have been advertised to both India and Australia (Keck, 2015). And while these sales
are relatively small compared to the global defense market, they are baby steps that may precede
a large scale expansion in both Japan’s military manufacturing and defense posture. Japan could
conceivably become a sort of 21st century “arsenal of democracy;” its advanced military
industries arming the potential alliance. And its military force could rival or surpass almost any
in the world. But there are severe limitations to fulfilling this role.
Shigeru Yoshida was the first prime minister of post-war Japan. Japan had been
completely devastated following the war, leaving its cities, industries and economy in ruins.
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Faced with starvation, economic depression, and national desperation, Yoshida made the
controversial decision to ignore rebuilding the Japanese military and focus instead solely on the
Japanese economy. Japan’s defense, he argued, would be provided for entirely by the United
States, leaving the Japanese people to reconstruct their country. This so-called “Yoshida
Doctrine” has been the guiding principle for much of Japan’s post-war history. However, it
wasn’t as if the Japanese had much of a choice in the first case.
The United States, as it did in Europe under the Marshall Plan, did much to help rebuild
Japan. They did not want the Japanese, driven by hunger, desperation or humiliation, to join with
the Communists and become remilitarized. Thus, the allies, under the leadership of General
MacArthur, pursued a policy of rebuilding the Japanese economy. But it was not just the
physical infrastructure that was to be rebuilt. Under allied guidance, the Japanese imperial
government was abolished and democracy put in its place. A constitution was written that gave
women the right to vote and guaranteed freedom of speech among other rights. But along with
the articles that granted liberties were sections which placed onerous restrictions on Japan’s
military and defense strategies.
Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution strictly forbids the development of any armed
forces with “war potential.” This somewhat enigmatic phrase has long since been interpreted to
mean offensive military capabilities. But even this definition is somewhat confusing. Generally,
weapons singled out in interpretations include, first and foremost, nuclear weapons as well as
those systems that allow “force projection” such as aircraft carriers and bombers. Thus, for more
than seventy years, the Japanese government has maintained a limited “defense force” which for
all intents and purposes is a military. This compromised force, along with the focus on the
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Yoshida Doctrine, has allowed Japan to experience economic growth and prosperity. But the
times have certainly changed since Yoshida first came to power (Port, 2009).
Today, Shinzo Abe, not Yoshida, is prime minster of Japan and, unlike his predecessor,
Abe and his fellow citizens face entirely new challenges. The Senkaku or Diaoyudao Islands,
depending on which country is asked, are a fiercely contested set of Islands administered by
Japan. China, of course, claims that historically the islands are Chinese. And, as in the South
China Sea, it has taken aggressive actions to assert that right. Chinese fishing boats and naval
vessels have approached the islands and harassed the Japanese Coast Guard. Chinese military
aircraft have buzzed the islands multiple times prompting the Japanese to scramble fighter
aircraft and remain on high alert. Japan, like its neighbors, is faced not just with a single
diplomatic dispute, but with a China that is becoming increasingly hostile (CFR, 2016).
To meet this gathering storm of Chinese aggression, Prime Minister Abe and the
conservatives he leads have had to become somewhat creative in their interpretations of the
traditionally pacifistic Japanese constitution. Japan, as has been shown, has traditionally been
limited to defensive actions and technology. However, under Abe, a so-called “Dynamic”
defense posture has been adopted (Hughes, 2015). Having always been prohibited from
exporting weapons, Japanese defense contractors, such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, produced
only limited numbers of weapons for the exclusive use of the Japanese military. Now, however,
the ban has been lifted, and Japanese companies are looking for new customers. Though they
were recently outflanked by a French defense manufacturer in a deal to supply advanced diesel
submarines to Australia, many have attributed the loss simply to the total lack of experience
Japanese defense companies have in selling abroad. Despite this setback, Japanese weapon
systems will almost certainly begin to have a significant impact on the region (Kelly T., 2016).
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Another significant shift in the Abe administration’s interpretation of the constitution is
its new doctrine of collective defense. Traditionally, the Japanese military was reserved strictly
for the defense of Japan. No other country or military could receive aid from the Japanese due to
constitutional restrictions. However, the Abe administration has argued that coming to the aid of
allies is in the best interests of Japanese defense. Armed with this new interpretation, Japanese
soldiers could find themselves fighting on the Korean border or in the Pacific with the American
Navy. Certainly then, this controversial reinterpretation has the potential to radically expand the
role of the Japanese military (Mie, 2016). But it is not without controversy.
Many in Japan feel that Abe’s actions are blatantly unconstitutional. And the pacifistic
Yoshida tradition still runs strong in Japanese politics. Getting Japan to fully abandon the tenets
of Article Nine and rearm would be a historic if not difficult accomplishment, but one that is
almost certainly necessary in order to form an effective defense pact. Moving to the second of
the two ghosts which still haunt Japan to this day is the lasting legacy of Japanese war crimes
committed during World War II.
During the war, Japanese military commanders and soldiers committed some of the most
horrific war crimes of the entire war. In China, the invading Japanese slaughtered hundreds of
thousands of civilians by shooting, hanging and even burying them alive. The Rape of Nanking,
perhaps the most notorious incident of Japanese genocide against civilians, resulted in the deaths
of 20,000 to 300,000 Chinese civilians, though the numbers are disputed. Thousands of women
from China, Korea, and the Philippines were coerced into brothels to serve as comfort women,
many of whom were raped to death. In addition, thousands of allied soldiers were forced into
hard labor and concentration camps. Following the war, the United States prosecuted many of
the military leaders who perpetrated these atrocities at the Tokyo Trials. However, amnesty was
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also shown to many lower level war criminals in 1958 when thousands were rehabilitated and
released back into society (UMBC, 2016).
Controversy persists to this day and many of the nations who suffered under Japanese
colonialism and barbarism, feel that the nation has never fully, satisfactorily apologized for the
crimes that it committed. In 1995 Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama officially issued
an apology for the crimes committed by Japanese military forces during the war (Wudunn,
1995). And in the past, compensation has been offered to certain victims. However, this has not
satisfied many people, partly owing to the ongoing tradition of some high level Japanese
politicians who have continually visited Shinto shrines where top Japanese war criminals are
honored.
Shinzo Abe is the latest to have visited the controversial Yasukuni Shrine wherein the
names of several Class A Japanese war criminals are kept, as per Shinto tradition. Abe’s visits to
the Shrine have done much to inflame and outrage neighboring nation’s sensibilities, including
China and Korea. Unfortunately, Abe has even expressed doubts as to the validity of the history
of comfort women; many of whom, he claimed, entered brothels willingly (Reuters, 2016). From
a diplomatic standpoint, the actions of Abe and other Japanese politicians does nothing to
mollify China where anti-Japanese sentiment is already high. And from the stand point of
forming an alliance, South Korea and the Philippines still harbor bad feelings, though in 2015
Japan finally officially apologized to South Korean comfort women and offered more than eight
million dollars as compensation (BBC, 2015). Clearly, even after so many years, the legacy of
Japanese war crimes still breeds mistrust and sours the diplomatic atmosphere.
It seems, then, that for Japan to take its place in any Asian-Pacific alliance, it must first
shake off the past which still haunts it to this day. Alliances are, as Realists remind us, only
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temporary arrangements. They are inherently shaky and unstable and are only entered into if
nations believe it is in their best interests. If the nations which surround Japan do not feel that
their former enemy is fully repentant, they may not be inclined to join in an alliance with them.
But if Japan can escape the restrictive bonds of its post-war constitution and come to terms with
the crimes of its forefathers–to the satisfaction of its victims–then it may be able to take its place
in an Asian-Pacific alliance.
Challenge #3: Straw that Broke the Eagle’s Back
The United States military is a truly fearsome entity to behold. Arguably the most
powerful fighting force in history, few, if any, of the world’s other militaries even begin to
approach its size, scope or capabilities. In fact, the amount of money and resources that the
United States spends and expends to maintain and improve its armed forces is simply
breathtaking. The American military consumes a budget of over 600 billion dollars annually, a
sum that accounts for some 50 percent of federal discretionary spending and 3-4 percent of
national GDP. The United States maintains ten aircraft carriers, as many as the rest of the world
combined (Walker D., 2014). It is through these aircraft carriers, as well as the worldwide
network of bases and airfields maintained by the US, that allows it to project its military forces
anywhere on earth, truly making it a global fighting force. And though its size has diminished
over the years, the United States still maintains the most capable and powerful navy, air force,
and army in the world. Still, though, could the United States afford to take part in an AsianPacific alliance? Already the American tax payer is responsible for more than the American
military alone.
Every year, the United States Congress approves billions of dollars in military aid to
various American allies around the world. Countries such as Israel and Egypt, the two largest
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recipients, receive aid packages worth more than a billion each, while other smaller countries
receive only hundreds of millions of dollars (State Department, 2016). Besides its commitment
to individual countries, the United States participates in the NATO alliance. The United States
directly contributes 500 million dollars to the defense pact, which in and of itself is not much.
However, the United States is one of only five NATO countries out of 28 total which meets
NATO’s minimum goal of 2 percent of GDP spending on defense. This deficit has prompted US
officials to call for increases in those NATO members who fall short of the minimum
(Kottasova, 2016). Until then, the United States continues to play an outsized role in NATO as it
does in most of its defense relationships.
Clearly, the United States spends an incredible amount of money on not only its own
defense but for many of its allies as well. The United States is the cornerstone of NATO as it was
of SEATO. The question then naturally arises as to whether or not the United States could even
afford to participate in an Asian-Pacific NATO-type alliance, especially considering its almost
guaranteed oversized role in any such prospective organization as well as its already existing
commitments. Just as it is the “hub” of today’s quasi-alliance system, the United States would
undoubtedly be the key player and the main force in any Asian-Pacific alliance. During the Cold
War, the United States determined that balancing against the Soviet Union was vital to national
security. It accomplished this balancing, in part, by enlisting the help of the nations of Western
Europe. Today, in the face of a rising China, the United States would still be the key country that
could tip the scales and balance the power equation of the Asia-Pacific region. Yet, without the
backing of the United States, it is doubtful that any effective Asian-Pacific alliance could be
formed. Unfortunately, for proponents of an alliance system, the ability of the United States to
participate in such a system would, financially speaking, be very difficult.
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In 1991 the world was treated to the grainy visuals of cameras mounted on American
smart bombs plunging into the key infrastructure, aircraft, and weapons of Saddam Hussein’s
Iraqi army. The United States stunned the world by deploying an ultra-modern Cold War
military which eviscerated the opposition in a matter of weeks. In the following year, the Soviet
Union was officially dissolved, leaving the United States with its state-of-the-art armed forces, as
the undisputed “super power” of the world. As a super power, the United States has enjoyed
what some scholars would describe as a “unipolar” world. Simply put, there has been no other
country that could even begin to challenge us. Yet, the world has changed since 1991 and with it,
the United States’ position in it.
While the United States still maintains the most powerful military in the world, its
invincibility is no longer guaranteed. Its position at the top of the global pinnacle was first
shaken after 9/11. That searing event launched two wars in two countries which, even 15 years
later, are still roiling in unceasing conflict. The financial costs of these two conflicts is almost
incalculable. However, some studies predict that when all expenditures have been taken into
account, both conflicts will have a final price 4 to 6 trillion dollars (Londoño, 2013). Yet it is not
just the financial cost that has drained the United States.
The wars and deployments of the past 15 years have taken both a heavy physical as well
as psychological toll. Most of the weapons that have been used in the War on Terror are the same
systems that existed in the Gulf War. These Cold War era weapons have been endlessly
retrofitted, repaired and sent back into combat. And in the year-after-year grind of ongoing war,
billions of dollars’ worth of equipment has become worn out and used up. Man, as well as
machine, has also suffered. Soldiers have been sent on countless deployments and the cumulative
effects have devastated both the service men and women and their families. Veteran suicides and
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post-traumatic stress related problems are through the roof, and though this may not be directly
attributable to multiple deployments, they are some of the highest numbers ever recorded
(Zoroya, 2016). This increasingly threadbare force is now also facing the reality of evershrinking budgets.
With the persistent effects of the 2008 financial crisis, terms like sequestration and
budget cuts have become household words. With mounting debt and a slumping economy,
Congress has been forced to tighten the belt, or at least threaten to do so. During the height of the
Cold War, the military was provided with an almost blank check. But today the Pentagon is
being pulled in two different directions: paying for ever-more expensive weapon systems while
trying to find ways to creatively cut and sometimes hide military spending.
The high tech military of the Cold War is only getting more and more high tech. As
technology advances at a rapid pace, the Pentagon is building increasingly sophisticated weapon
systems. Yet paying for these technological leaps and bounds costs a lot of dollars and cents. The
F-35 stealth fighter, as one example, is the military’s cutting edge replacement for its aging Cold
War squadrons. Yet unlike past jet fighter programs, the F-35 has turned into a nightmare, beset
with delays and technical problems and, in the process, becoming the most expensive weapon in
history. And it is not alone. Other programs such as the Navy’s Zumwalt Destroyer, billed as the
future of Naval combat, have reached costs so astronomical that many units of the previous
generation of destroyers could be bought for the price of one Zumwalt. Due in part to the paymore-get-less predicament of modern weapons, combined with its shrinking budget, the
Pentagon has had to cancel many other promising programs. From the cancellation of the
arguably more capable predecessor to the F-35, the F-22 stealth fighter, to landing craft and
helicopters, the military has seen a slew of next generation weapon systems scrapped due to high
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price tags and limited budgets (Bender, 2016). Just this year, Pentagon brass will have to cut an
additional five billion dollars out of their budget (Gould, 2015). Yet, in recent years, both
military leadership and certain congressmen and women, have found a loop hole through which
to hide increases in spending.
The OCO, or Overseas Contingency Operations fund, is a supplemental military budget
in addition to the Department of Defense’s base budget. The OCO’s express purpose is for
providing emergency funding for operations or conflicts that occur suddenly and require the
military to resolve. However, with more and more pressure on the base budget, some
congressmen and women have adopted the practice of parking base budget line items in the
OCO, thus avoiding having to make cuts. This shell-game of moving projects to different
budgets has been a trick that the Obama administration has attempted to end (Davidson, 2015).
Nevertheless, despite some rearranging of the proverbial deck chairs, the military has now
shrunk to a size not seen since before World War II (Fox News, 2016). This is perhaps most
dramatically illustrated by the US Navy which has shrunk from its Cold War high of 600 ships to
just over 200 today (Jacobson, 2015). In fact, many experts have come to the conclusion that the
US military would not be able to wage and win a so-called “two front war” as it did in World
War II (Wiser, 2015). To add to this poor prognostication of the military’s health, global events
seem to be spiraling ever more out of control.
As if the depreciating effects of two wars and asphyxiating budget constraints were not
enough, the United States is facing more threats to its national security and place in the world
than at any time since World War II. China, one of the main focuses of this discussion, is moving
aggressively in the Asia-Pacific region, seizing maritime territory and transgressing borders, all
while building its military into a peer competitor of the United States. Russia is flexing its
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muscles as well throughout the world, while drawing ever closer to China and exchanging
weapons technology and fostering what could become an alliance. Iran, though beginning to
reenter normal relations with the West, still continually cries for the destruction of Israel and,
many would say, continues to seek nuclear weapons. The other pariah of the international
community, North Korea, is already armed with nuclear weapons. Its new leader, Kim Jong Un,
possesses a questionable grasp on sanity and is leading what appears to be an increasingly
unstable government and nation. Finally, ISIS, a supranational terrorist organization that
seemingly sprung up from the ground like a mushroom, is now metastasizing in Syria and Iraq
while committing attack after attack on innocent civilians all over Europe. To put it succinctly,
the United States faces more threats than perhaps ever before, with a military that is the smallest
it has been in a century.
Clearly, the trifecta of a war-worn, cash starved, overworked military is a recipe for a
disaster. Neither the United States nor an Asian-Pacific NATO could hope to balance a rising
China if they do not even have the money to maintain a modern military. Also clear is that any
Asian-Pacific NATO-type alliance, as with the actual NATO, would demand a sizable role for
the United States. There are several potential Asian-Pacific alliance members who have
advanced and prosperous economies. Japan, South Korea and perhaps Taiwan, are all first world
countries that can afford modern expensive militaries. But other potential alliance members, such
as the Philippines and Vietnam, would struggle to field even a fraction of what is needed to
defend them and their possessions in the South China Sea. Just as with their NATO counterparts,
there would be many members of the Asian-Pacific alliance who would struggle to meet basic
defense spending requirements. A serious question arises as to whether or not the United States

55

can afford yet another commitment on its scarce resources. Overcoming this problem would be
essential before even considering an Asian-Pacific NATO.
Challenge #4: Nine Dashes Behind the Eight Ball
Any potential Asian-Pacific NATO would need to decide what it would protect and what
it would leave undefended. This, though, is complicated by the complex territorial environment
of the South China Sea. Unfortunately, in this respect, the original NATO did not face an exact
parallel. In the opening chapter of the Cold War, the countries of Western Europe faced a
frightening prospect: Soviet domination. Already, the nations of Eastern Europe had been rolled
up and “liberated” by the Russian megalith which was now poised to do the same to Western
Europe. Exhausted by conflict and seeking to hold off the “Red” war machine, France, Great
Britain, Belgium, Luxemburg and the Netherlands signed the Treaty of Brussels creating a
Western European defense pact. Armed with this treaty, the signatories were guaranteed that
each member would come to the other’s defense in case of an invasion or attack by an outside
power. But the treaty was as thin as the paper on which it was printed. The treaty was clearly
drafted with the Soviet Union in mind, but the signatories were so weak, they could never hope
to hold off Soviet forces, even together. To wage a credible defense and deterrent, they needed
more firepower (Fenton, 2012).
Out of this dearth of military power emerged NATO. One of the chief reasons for the
creation of NATO was to include the United States and its powerful armed forces. With US
forces in Europe, a credible defense and deterrent was established. The legal mechanism through
which this deterrent was established was Article 5 of the NATO treaty. Much like its forbearer,
the Treaty of Brussels, Article 5 of NATO guaranteed mutual defense and aid by all if any one
member came under attack (MacCloskey, 1967). Thankfully, in the forty-plus years of the Cold
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War, Article 5 was never invoked. Perhaps the reason for the stability and peace maintained
between the East and West was due in part to the stability of the borders.
The Soviet Union, for all intents and purposes had invaded Eastern Europe during the fog
of World War II. However, in the tense days following the end of the war, borders stabilized and
solidified, becoming impenetrable barriers of barbed wire and concrete. The Iron Curtain was
clearly demarcated, and crossing it would have been a blatant, explicit action. Yet in the new
Cold War that is shaping up in Asia, the borders are not so clear.
In many ways, the threat is still the same: a single country, expanding its borders and
territory through aggressive actions. Yet the borders in the South China Sea have definitely not
settled or solidified into any new “Iron Curtain.” Instead, the nautical boundary lines of each
South China Sea claimant nation are overlapping and tangled together. The entire purpose of an
Asian-Pacific NATO-type alliance would be for mutual protection against an aggressive China.
But what, exactly, would the alliance protect? How can borders be defended if the boundaries of
those borders are in question?
One of the first challenges to be dealt with by an Asian-Pacific alliance would be the
legitimacy of different kinds of claims. Historical claims are perhaps the most prominent. In
particular, China’s nine-dash line dominates any conversation regarding the South China Sea.
The nine-dash line is the device China has used to proclaim its absolute sovereignty in the South
China Sea. Based on ancient traditions and documents, the nine dash line overlaps every other
nation’s territorial waters in the South China Sea. Within this line, China has constructed its
infamous artificial islands, spewing dredged-up sand and rock onto pristine coral reefs. How,
then, should an Asian-Pacific alliance respond to these actions and claims? Would the alliance
recognize the legitimacy of these claims?
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One body that has certainly not recognized the claims of China is the Permanent Court of
Arbitration. A mainstay of over one hundred years for nation-states seeking to resolve their
disputes, the Court regularly settles international boundary disputes. In 2013 the Philippines
brought before the Court its claims to the South China Sea, to be arbitrated and settled. China did
not take part in the proceedings, claiming that the Philippines had violated previous treaties by
inviting third parties to settle the dispute. Incredibly, China is a party to the Permanent Court and
officially recognizes its legitimacy. Despite its official recognition of the Court, China flatly
rejected the Court’s finding in favor of the Philippines (PRC, 2016) (Denyer, 2016). An AsianPacific NATO-type alliance would have to decide whether or not to recognize the Permanent
Court’s ruling. If it did, it would leave it with the official position of rejecting the entire nine
dash line. It would then be faced with the dilemma of how to respond to not only existing
artificial islands, but potential future ones as well.
But China, by basing its claims on ancient documents, is simultaneously violating
modern maritime rights and well as the Court’s decision. Up to 12-miles from the shore of a
nation are the sovereign waters of that nation. Crossing over into or violating those waters would
be akin to crossing a border on land. Within these sovereign waters, a nation can exercise
absolute control. However, extending 200-miles from the shore line is a nation’s exclusive
economic zone (EEZ). Within that area, the country in question does not have an absolute right
to oversee who enters, but does have exclusive rights to exploit the natural resources of the
waters. Ships from other nations may cross into this EEZ, but they may not fish or conduct any
other economic activities without the express permission of the host country. Both sovereign and
exclusive economic zone waters were established by the United Nation’s Law of the Sea Treaty.
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And all claimants to the South China Sea, including China, are parties to the treaty; that is to say,
that they recognize the treaty as international law (PCA, 2016).
But China has broken this law. Not only has China built artificial islands using a
discredited map, but it has built several of them inside of the 200-mile EEZ of the Philippines, an
act completely illegal under the United Nations Law of the Sea. And the People’s Republic has
not only built these artificial and illegal islands, but has also taken the step of repeatedly
blocking the lawful exploitation of economic resources in Philippine waters by harassing and
cutting off Filipino fishermen from their traditional fishing waters. However, this violation of
international law did not happen overnight. There are many coral reefs both in and outside of the
Philippine’s EEZ that have been occupied by China, and many of them have fallen to China in
the same way (PCA, 2016).
Mischief Reef, for example, was once administered by the Philippines. Philippine
fishermen and naval vessels exploited and patrolled the waters in and around Mischief Reef for
decades. But then everything changed. The Philippines had been a large and vital strategic base
for the American Navy. Despite this, in 1991 the Philippine government ejected all US personnel
and closed all US naval and air force bases. It didn’t take long for China to exploit this selfimposed isolation. In 1995 China took advantage of the Philippine navy’s absence during the
monsoon season and constructed a crude ramshackle collection of stilted huts in the shallows of
Mischief Reef. Seeking to avoid an international incident, and reassured by the Chinese that the
structure was merely a refuge for fishermen, the Philippines accepted the seemingly innocuous
toe-hold. But these shaky huts would soon be replaced by a large concrete outpost in 1999. This
pattern was repeated on other islands throughout the South China Sea, as China constructed
various structures on shallow potions of contested reefs. Finally, Mischief Reef was completely
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transformed in 2015 and 2016 when dredging ships piled sand on the shallow coral, turning it
into a man-made island. Now Mischief Reef boasts an airplane runway as well as multiple
structures and installations. The transformation of Mischief Reef has been shocking if not awe
inspiring. The Chinese have established a strong and seemingly permanent presence on Mischief
Reef, a presence within the Philippines’ 200-mile EEZ (CNAS, 2016). But Mischief Reef is not
the only Philippine possession that has been targeted by Xi Jinping’s China.
Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Shoal, both claimed by the Philippines and both
in Philippine’s EEZ, are threatened by further Chinese expansion. The Chinese have effectively
seized Scarborough blocking entrance to all Philippine vessels, a familiar tactic. However, just as
with Mischief Reef, Scarborough Shoal belongs to the Philippines, though in practice, the
Chinese exercise absolute control. At Second Thomas shoal, the story is somewhat different.
There, a ragtag band of Filipino marines posted on an ancient beached Philippine navy ship that
is little more than a rusted shell, act as sentries keeping Chinese forces from conquering the reef.
Circling this rusted, immobile hulk are, ironically, Chinese coast guard ships (perhaps in itself a
message) in a long waiting game to see who can last longer. The marines are only infrequently
resupplied, as the Philippine navy is often too timid to confront the Chinese vessels.
Nevertheless, this desperate outpost has, so far, halted the Chinese advance. But for how long?
How long until the circling communists tire of the stand-off (Himmelman, 2016)?
If an Asian-Pacific NATO comes into existence, it must decide where to draw the lines. It
must decide what “Article 5” is worthy and what is not. If the alliance commits to protecting the
integrity of the 200-mile EEZ of its members (which would undoubtedly include the Philippines)
then it must approach the current situation very carefully. It may decide to let the Chinese
continue to occupy Mischief and Scarborough while drawing a line at other reefs such as Second
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Thomas. It may pull back only to sovereign waters within 12-miles of the coast, or it could go on
the offensive, cutting off artificial islands like Mischief and instigating a second Cuban Missile
like crisis. Realist theory predicts that states are inherently suspicious of each other. Furthermore,
in a multipolar world, such as we now live in, the possibility of a mistake leading to war is
greatly increase. These theoretical realizations, combined with the tensions in the South China
Sea, makes for an incredibly dangerous environment. Clearly, the decisions on where to draw the
red lines, which islands to protect and which to let go of, are questions of vital importance and
one of the most important and complicated challenges to forming any kind of Asian-Pacific
alliance and achieving a Realist balance of power in the region.
Challenge #5: Blow Back
Actions taken by an Asian-Pacific NATO could result in unintended consequences. But
consequences are always a risk when military and intelligence organizations make decisions. In
fact, in the espionage and national security community there is a term for unintended
consequences that result from covert operations: blowback. Blowback was a term coined by the
CIA to describe the unforeseen complications that their top secret missions would invariably
produce. Perhaps the most classic example was the creation of Al-Qaeda. During the 1980’s the
Soviet Union invaded and occupied Afghanistan. After installing a pro-Soviet puppet state, the
Russian troops battled an aggressive and persistent insurgency. But the Mujahedeen were not just
formidable because of their tenacity. Armed with CIA supplied American stinger missiles, the
Afghan rebels were able to defeat the advanced ground attack helicopters of the Soviet Union
which had been decimating their ranks. However, despite achieving the withdrawal of Soviet
forces in 1989, the CIA had unknowingly created a monster. More than a decade later, elements
of the Mujahedeen, combined with other radical Islamists, struck the World Trade Center towers
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in New York, killing thousands (Bergen, 2005). Unintended, unforeseen, and even unwanted
consequences are all a part of the strategic and military decision making process and sometimes
they are simply unavoidable.
In Realist theory, the concept of blowback is more commonly described as a security
dilemma. Security dilemmas take place when the actions of one state to strengthen its’ defenses,
such as building an alliance, spurs opposing states to strengthen their security and take similar
measures. This ping-pong action can turn into a spiral as each nation attempts to gain an edge
over the other. In the end, an attempt to make your country more secure does just the opposite as
your enemy seeks to match or exceed your capabilities. During the early days of NATO, there
was much talk of including West Germany in the defense pact. Western military planners felt
that absent West German manpower, it would have been almost impossible to have protected
Western Europe from a full scale Soviet invasion. Yet the proposition to rearm and redeploy
West German armed forces did not come without serious opposition from within and without
NATO. Both France and the Soviet Union, who had lost millions of soldiers fighting Nazi
Germany, strongly protested the inclusion. The Soviet Union even attempted to join NATO due
to its fears of a rearmed Germany. This attempt was, of course, rebuffed by NATO, who
perceived it as a ruse to undermine the very purpose of the defense pact. France, in its way, also
tried to prevent the admission of West Germany. It proposed a new defensive alliance1 that
would include German forces while simultaneously stripping West Germany of its ability to
command those very troops. This plan, too, failed to garner much support and eventually fell
apart, leaving the way open for the full inclusion of West Germany into NATO (Duignan, 2000).

1

The European Defense Community (EDC)
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The inclusion of West Germany into NATO and its subsequent rearmament, spurred the
Soviets to create their own defense pact. The Warsaw Pact was signed 1955 in Warsaw, Poland
and brought together the Soviet Union and the majority of its satellite states under one defensive
umbrella. Like its Western adversary and counterpart NATO, the Warsaw Pact guaranteed that
an attack on one member would be considered an attack on all. Throughout the rest of the Cold
War these two steely-eyed confederations would be locked in a tense stand-off until the eventual
demise of the Soviet Union. The two armed giants never did engage in combat, and about the
most action that Warsaw Pact forces ever saw was the internal suppression of uprisings in
Czechoslovakia. And while some question the efficacy or even the Soviet need for the Warsaw
Pact, few question the impetus for its creation (Gaddis, 2005). With this historical lesson in mind
we must ask: would the creation of an Asian-Pacific NATO-type alliance precipitate a
“blowback” response from the Chinese? Would the Chinese create their own alliance or become
more aggressive?
Much like the Soviets sixty years ago, the Chinese are already wary of any sort of
alliance being formed against them. In a revealing interview with the Wall Street Journal,
Chinese ambassador to the United States Cui Tiankai characterized the US’s bilateral “hub and
spoke” defense pacts with various Asian-Pacific nations as “anti-China.” He continued to say
that the formation of any alliances that were aimed against China were counterproductive and
“stupid” (Horvath, 2015). Clearly, the Chinese Politburo is sensitive to any sort of push back or
talk of containment. The question then arises: would the Chinese form their own Warsaw Pact to
counter an alliance in Asia, or would they take even more aggressive actions?
There could be a number of reasons that the Chinese would form their own alliance.
Seeing the creation of an Asian-Pacific alliance as inherently “anti-China,” in the same way they
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now view American bilateral agreements, Chinese leaders would perhaps move to counter it by
developing their own equivalent. Or, such as was the case with the creation of the Warsaw Pact,
the inclusion of a specific member could be the trigger. As we have seen, the Japanese still carry
a lot of baggage from their imperial days. Not only China, but many other regional nations
harbor bad blood against Japan. China, in particular, hosts the most vehement anti-Japanese
sentiments in the region. These are, in large part, encouraged by the Communist Party to serve
their own agenda, and are also spurred on by nationalist outcry over the Senkaku Islands dispute.
As such, anti-Japanese feelings in China are at an all-time high. China is especially sensitive to
developments and changes in Japan’s defense posture. Increases in Japanese defense spending
under Shinzo Abe, have been criticized by Chinese observers and government officials, as have
policy changes allowing Japanese armed intervention in defense of allies. Even certain ships
built for the Japanese Navy have been met with suspicion. With the completion of a new
helicopter carrier ship, some Chinese commentators breathlessly declared it a full blown aircraft
carrier, something traditionally prohibited by the Japanese constitution (Gamble, 2016). It is easy
to see, then, that the inclusion of Japan into an Asian-Pacific NATO organization, and its
possible full rearmament, would have the potential effect of inflaming the Chinese, and could
even precipitate the building of a Chinese alliance. But what would such an alliance look like? In
fact, the framework may already exist.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a relatively new organization founded
by China, Russia and several Central Asian nations. Created initially as more of a forum to
address contentious border disputes, the SCO has evolved into a regional economic, political and
defense organization. One of the primary missions of the SCO is to combat the “three evils”:
terrorism, extremism, and separatism. Terrorism and extremism undoubtedly arose in a post 9/11
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environment. However, the commitment to combating “separatism” is especially alarming
considering China’s relationship with Taiwan and its view of that island as a rogue province.
Nevertheless, the SCO underlies the close relationship that has been developing between the
Peoples Republic of China and Putin’s Russia (Albert, 2015).
Both nations increasingly find themselves coloring outside of diplomatic (and territorial)
lines. China’s actions in the South China Sea have been condemned by the Permanent Court of
Arbitration, while Russia’s actions in Ukraine and Syria have likewise been criticized. In this
environment, the two rebuked nations draw closer, sharing weapon’s technology and voicing
support for each other in international forums. Though China has built a substantial military
industrial complex and produced many different homegrown weapons systems, it still draws
heavy inspiration from Russian designs. In fact, China’s one and only aircraft carrier is a Russian
built ship, and for the foreseeable future, it is highly likely that China will continue to benefit
from Russian weapon imports and licensing (CISIS, 2016). But the military relationship of the
two nations is not only limited to technology exchanges. In September of 2016, both nations will
hold a large naval wargame exercise in the South China Sea, a provocative action considering the
tensions there (Page, 2016). Besides the closer military ties of both Russia and China, the
economic dimension of the SCO is also being strengthened, stitching the member nations
together through trade and commerce. In 2015 the Russian state-owned oil and gas giant,
Gazprom, and the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed a multi-billion dollar
contract to supply energy-hungry China with Siberian natural gas (Rapoza, 2015). The alliance
of Russia and China would, without a doubt, be a formidable adversary. Yet a counter alliance is
not the only form that an Asian-Pacific NATO blowback could take.

65

China is, in its own right, a very powerful nation. With a population of over one billion
people and second largest economy in the world, China has the fortitude and resources to stand
on its own. The formation of an alliance arrayed against China could spur them into taking
aggressive, unilateral actions. For one, the Chinese could resume the island building projects in
the South China Sea, capturing and constructing artificial islands and, in the process, create an
international crisis. Or, Chinese strategists could take a more subtle approach.
Currently, the Chinese government is developing, or trying to develop, ports in several
nations that ring the Indian Ocean. Harbors, such as the Gwadar port in Pakistan, have received
significant Chinese investment money to aid in infrastructure development. These ports are,
ostensibly, for the furthering of China’s ambitious “One Belt, One Road” trading plan, whereby
China seeks to develop closer trading ties to various Eurasian nations. However, some have
speculated that these ports could be developed for military purposes just as easily as for
economic ones. Under this interpretation, the Chinese, as one US think tank termed it, are
creating a “String of Pearls;” a series of naval bases encircling the Indian Ocean, thus giving the
Chinese tremendous strategic leverage. This “string” would start in the South China Sea before
snaking its way along various coasts to the tip of Africa (Baker, 2015). Any such arrangement
would allow the Chinese to secure their Middle Eastern Oil Supply while also threatening the
flow to its neighbors.
The Chinese navy would also greatly benefit from any such plan. As of now, the Chinese
navy is hemmed into the East and South China Seas by the First and Second Island chains. The
first Island chain consists of Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia, almost all of which
host American or other naval forces potentially hostile to China. The Second Island Chain is
populated by much smaller islands, the most important being Guam. These surrounding naval
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and military forces act to bottle up China in its own territorial waters and, in a time of war, could
be used to completely blockade the nation (Navarro, 2015). But, if significant Chinese forces
were based in the Indian Ocean, this containment strategy would be far less effective. In a sense,
if the Chinese responded to an Asian-Pacific alliance by making the String of Pearls a reality, the
conflict which heretofore has been contained to the East and South China Seas, would greatly
expand in scope, taking on global proportions.
Would an Asian-Pacific NATO still be strategically desirable in the face of such
significant blowback? Could an Asian-Pacific NATO cope with a robust and hostile SCO or with
the expansion of Chinese naval assets into the Indian Ocean? Or, would it be better to simply fall
back on the tried and true Hub and Spoke system in an attempt to quiet Chinese tensions? The
purpose of an Asian-NATO is to balance the rise of China. However, as some Realists predict,
doing so can precipitate a security dilemma. The nations surrounding China may very well be
successful in building an alliance, but doing so could spur China to pursue more aggressive
defensive strategies, exactly as Realist theorists would predict.
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CHAPTER III: THE SOLUTIONS
In this chapter, we will examine potential solutions to the challenges examined in the last
chapter. The original NATO was able to successfully justify its existence simply because it was
needed. Likewise, an Asian-Pacific NATO could make a strong case for its creation by the fact
that alliances have many benefits currently not present in the hub and spoke system. Second,
NATO made the controversial decision to include West Germany in the alliance. Likewise, an
Asian-Pacific NATO would have to make the decision to include Japan in its alliance. However,
the barriers and repercussions of doing so could be mitigated. Like its European counterpart, an
Asian-Pacific NATO would need to spend more on defense but it could do so effectively by
refocusing its priorities and purchasing more cost effective weapons. Territorial disputes, while
virtually unknown to the original NATO, would be a paramount concern to an Asian-Pacific
NATO. By staking out red lines and appealing to international law, an Asian-Pacific NATO
could make great progress in lowering tensions. Finally, as the original NATO had to face the
blowback of the Warsaw Pact, an Asian-Pacific NATO could be confronted with significant
blowback from China. However, as the original NATO demonstrated, sometimes it is best to
simply whether the storm.
Old NATO, Old Solutions
The original European NATO was confronted with many challenges of its own. From
justifying its own existence to including such controversial members as West Germany, it was
confronted with a myriad of difficult challenges. Yet, in each instance, it managed to resolve
most if not all of them. Identifying how it solved these challenges gives us insight into how our
hypothetical Asian-Pacific NATO might solve its challenges as well.
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Returning to the first challenge, the nations of Western Europe were already protected by
the Treaty of Brussels and the defense pact that was drafted as a result. Why then was NATO
even needed? In fact, the founders of the Treaty of Brussels themselves pushed for the creation
of NATO. The Treaty of Brussels lacked one vital and indispensable member: the United States.
NATO was justified on the basis of the inclusion of the United States. Without the United States,
Europe lacked a credible deterrent and could not possibly hope to balance against the Soviet
Union. Thus the challenge of justifying the creation of NATO was an easy argument for the
founders of the defense pact. Turning to the inclusion of controversial members, this too was a
challenge met by NATO. West Germany was needed to help secure Europe and balance against
the Soviet Union. Just like the United States, West Germany was indispensable. Yet, despite the
protests of some countries, NATO successfully absorbed the military of West Germany and in
doing so, solved the imbalance of power with the Soviet Union (Gaddis, 1998).
The Challenge of the affordability of military expenditures was also met by the members
of NATO. NATO forces were consistently able to outspend their Soviet counterparts and thus
win the Cold War. Military expenditures were also mitigated by prioritizing what to defend.
However, sometimes deficit spending was required for the strategy of out spending the Soviet
Union to work. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States and NATO were faced with
the prospect of Soviet nuclear weapons stationed off the coast of the continental United States.
These weapons threatened the territorial security of the United States and thus NATO. Yet, the
Soviet Union had already been put in the same position by the United States who had stationed
weapons in Turkey, close to the borders of the Soviet Union. Both nations agreed to remove their
respective weapons and thus preserving the territorial integrity of their respective nations.
Finally, NATO had to contend with the challenge of blowback that resulted from its action to
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include West Germany in its alliance. The Soviet Union, fearing a resurgent Germany, reacted to
the inclusion of West Germany by constructing its own defensive alliance, the Warsaw Pact. Yet,
just as NATO had balanced against the Soviet Union for decades, it continued to maintain
balance even with the Warsaw Pact. The effect of the blowback was mitigated and successfully
contained (Gaddis, 1998).
Thus, the original European NATO managed to consistently solve the numerous
challenges that confronted it throughout the Cold War. Surprisingly, many of them were similar
to the challenges that could potentially face an Asian-Pacific NATO today.
Solutions for a 21st Century Asian-Pacific NATO
In this section we will examine solutions to the five challenges facing an Asian-Pacific NATO.
First, the hub and spoke system, while mimicking an official alliance, does not provide the same
benefits that an actual alliance would. Secondly, the impediments between Japan and its
inclusion in an Asian-Pacific alliance are shown to be completely surmountable. Third, the cost
of an Asian-Pacific NATO-type alliance can be better absorbed by the United States through a
reprioritization of vital interests and focusing on more cost-effective weapons. Fourthly,
territorial disputes can be resolved, or at least made more manageable, through the use of
international law and the ruling of The Hague. Finally, there may be no simple solution to
blowback. Instead, an Asian-Pacific NATO would possibly have to simply absorb the
consequences of its actions.
Hub and Spoke Solution
Returning to the challenge of the apparent sufficiency of the Hub and Spoke model, we
remember that the United States maintains a formidable quiver of bilateral alliances. Some of the
most advanced nations in Asia enjoy mutual defense pacts with the United States, thus greatly
70

boosting their national defenses. Furthermore, many if not all experts advocate for a
strengthening of the Hub and Spoke system with its bilateral relationships. They believe that the
bundle of American alliance countries is sufficient to maintain and attain a balance with a rising
China. But relying on the hub and spoke system is like riding a bicycle with only a hub and
spokes: you won’t get very far.
Looking at the combined firepower of the American hub and its Asian spokes, it is, at
first, hard to see where there is even a need for an Asian-Pacific NATO. However, alliances,
bilateral or other, and defenses are about more than just physical guns and ships. Balance of
power, as explained by Cold War expert John Lewis Gaddis, is not always based on actual power
as much as it is on the perception of power. Sometimes, security is reliant on your enemy’s
perception of your power as much as it is on your actual power. Alliances, apart from being the
combined fighting forces of many different nations, are, in and of themselves, potent statements.
They serve to put adversaries on notice, and at the same time, reassure allies. At their core,
alliances are tasked with two objectives: to deter and defend. Defenses are obvious enough. They
are what we can see and count; they are the assets which are readily converted into tables and
graphs. But deterrence is somewhat more immaterial. Deterrence is based on defense, but it is
different. Deterrence is the mechanism by which the use of defensive forces is unnecessary. And
an alliance that can successfully deter its enemy is a successful alliance (Gaddis, 2005).
An Asian-Pacific NATO may not greatly expand the physical capabilities of Asia’s
individual armed forces, but it would serve as a powerful deterrent. The perception that the
combined armed forces of an Asian-Pacific NATO projected, would create a powerful deterrent;
making any country think twice before engaging in illegal actions in the South China Sea.
Boundaries are not so carelessly transgressed when an adversary believes that there would be
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consequences. As of now, these consequences are left up to one nation to deal out: the United
States.
As the hub of the hub and spoke system, the United States is the fallback power for
almost every nation in the region. This, of course, puts tremendous pressure on the United States,
while leaving other powers free to off-load responsibilities. If the Philippines were to be
attacked, it would be the United States alone who would be obligated to come to its aid.
Likewise, if Japan was blockaded, or South Korea invaded, the United States would be the sole
power to respond. As we have discussed, the United States is already under considerable
pressure globally, and waging a full scale war in Asia would strain its already overtaxed forces.
However, a true multinational alliance would help to spread the burden. Previous military
planners saw the necessity of spreading defensive burdens when they brought West Germany
into the NATO fold. Absent West German manpower, Western leaders did not see how they
could repel a Soviet invasion. Just as part of the NATO burden was shared with West Germany,
the American burden could be shared with fellow members of an Asian-Pacific NATO in a way
that it is not true at this present time (Gaddis, 1998). If one spoke is attacked, all spokes respond.
But to have this collective response, you need to have a collective fighting force.
During the Second World War, the allied armies banded together to defeat Nazi Germany
and Imperial Japan. And while the mission of these allied armies was the same, the equipment
they used to complete their mission was not. Each army used different ammunition and
maintained different standards for communication and strategy. Today, however, the European
armies of NATO have standardized almost every aspect of their militaries. From bullets to
gasoline blends, the entire logistical infrastructure is interchangeable within all member nations.
STANAG, or Standardization Agreement, is the process by which NATO has standardized its
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fighting forces. But far from simply standardizing things that go boom, STANAG has made
compatible almost every facet of military operations. Everything from the procedures for landing
fighter jets to the type of radios frequencies used, all are NATO standard. Thus, in the din of
battle, the combined armed forces of NATO would (in theory) meld into a single cohesive
fighting force (NATO, 2015). Standardization is important but it is only one piece of an alliance
puzzle. Centralization is equally important as well.
In a hypothetical NATO war, French, British and American forces would not be
commanded at the top by French, British and American commanders but by NATO commanders
(MacCloskey, 1967). This centralization, like standardization, ensures that NATO can function
as one army. Even though most of the armies that the United States has defense treaties with use
NATO standardized equipment, an Asian-Pacific alliance STANAG agreement would ensure
that this standardization is complete and comprehensive across all forces. Furthermore, an Asian
alliance would provide for the centralization of command and decision making. Rather than
having disparate and dis-unified spokes, an alliance system would be able to harness the
combined power the East and Southeast Asian nations into a very large and competent fighting
force.
Separately, the spokes of the current hub and spoke system are relatively weak. But
bound together, like a Roman fasces, the alliance of spokes would be a powerful deterrent,
creating a check against further Chinese expansionism. Not only would the perception of allied
power be greatly expanded but, in actuality, the combination of forces would create a sum
greater than its parts. By forging a common fighting force, an Asian-Pacific NATO would give
the armies threatened by China capabilities they did not heretofore possess and achieve a Realist
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balance of power. The hub and the spokes would finally become a wheel and, in the process, take
an alliance much further down the road to security.
Two Yurei Solution
Japan, as we have explored previously, is a very economically and technologically
advanced country. With the third-largest GDP in the world, Japan would certainly be one of the
most capable and powerful alliance members in an Asia-Pacific Alliance. However, as we have
discussed before, Japan is constrained by two “ghosts” from its past that still haunt it to this day.
Both the Japanese’s pacifistic constitution and the legacy of war crimes committed against their
neighbors limits Japan both legally and diplomatically from assuming its hypothetical role in an
alliance and from an expanded defense role in the here and now. Yet, turning to the question of
constitutional restrictions, there may be fewer impediments than commonly thought.
Following the Japanese defeat after the War, the occupying US forces under General
MacArthur tasked the defeated government with drafting a new constitution. However,
traditionalist Japanese politicians, schooled in an era of imperialism, attempted to paper over the
most objectionable portions of the old Meiji era imperial constitution, a tactic which did not
impress MacArthur. After encountering the stubbornness of the Japanese political establishment,
MacArthur tasked his team with drafting a new constitution. The resulting document, which
severely limited Japan’s ability to maintain conventional armed forces, is still largely in force
today and has become a fixture of Japanese foreign policy and political thought. Yet, early on,
the very conquerors who wrote the constitution pressured Japan to abandon its pacifist articles
(Sugita, 2003).
During the early 1950’s, as the United States was engaged in the Korean War, it became
clear to both the US and the Japanese that the United States could not indefinitely provide total
74

protection for Japan. The United States was, at that time, concluding its occupation of Japan and
preparing to return sovereignty to the government and conclude a peace treaty with the island.
But with the emergent threat of Communism in Asia, the United States started to have second
thoughts over the pacifist elements of the constitution they had bestowed upon the Japanese. In a
remarkable policy turnabout, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles pushed Japanese Prime
Minister Yoshida hard to commit Japan to a rearmament plan. US delegates even went so far as
to suggest amending the constitution to largely do away with the pacifist Article 9. Yoshida
argued forcefully, yet diplomatically, that Japan was in no position economically to rearm, and
furthermore, feared the birth of a resurgent Japanese militarism should that position be pursued.
He even feared that a reinvigorated and rearmed Japan would alarm its neighbors and upset the
security and diplomatic post-war equilibrium that Japan had worked to build. Yet Dulles
continued to push him until the two came to a workable agreement. Japan would begin to build a
national police/ defense force (Sugita, 2003).
Today, this defense force is, in fact, a full blown military. Despite several largely selfimposed restrictions on different types of weapons, Japan wields an impressive amount of power.
And the rules governing the exercise of that power are becoming more and more permissive.
Japan has loosened regulations on arms exports, hawking their stealthy diesel submarines, patrol
boats and radar planes to a slew of Asian-Pacific countries. The Japanese Diet has also passed
legislation reinterpreting Article 9 and allowing for Japanese armed forces to assist allies in a
time of war. The simple fact is that today, Article 9 is a hopelessly obsolete law from a different
era. Yet, even in the era in which it was written, American policy makers thought it outdated.
Even Shinzo Abe, in pushing for greater liberties to create a modern military, has remarked that a
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strict reading of Article 9 expressly prohibits the defense force currently maintained by Japan
(Mie, 2016).
The line between defensive and offensive weapons is a subjective one, and with
increasing brinksmanship from China and the dangerous behavior of North Korea, Japan may
find itself only a few “interpretations” and “revisions” away from finally retiring their pacifist
past. When the final nail in the coffin of the old pacifist elements of Article 5 is hammered in, it
will be due more to the overcoming of Japanese attitudes than constitutional provisions. Another
attitude that prevents the exorcising of the last “Yurei,” or ghost, is a persistent reluctance on the
part of some Japanese to fully account and atone for Japanese war crimes.
It’s hard to forget the horrors of the World War II but some would rather pretend they
never even happened. The conservative establishment in Japanese politics has pushed hard for
revisions in the pacifist Japanese constitution, yet they have also attempted to revise history as
well. And while there have been past Japanese political administrations that apologized for
Japanese war crimes, some politicians, such as Abe, have attempted to minimize practices such
as the kidnaping and keeping of “comfort women.” (Woo, 2016) This denial has chilled relations
between Japan and her neighbors, both friend and foe. Yet relations may be starting to thaw
already. Japan has, as we have seen, created a program to provide reparations to South Korean
women who suffered in Japanese brothels. But some still feel that there has not been a full
repentance; a moment where the Japanese government fully admits the scope of its past crimes.
In 1970 German chancellor Willy Brant was in Warsaw, Poland for the signing of an
historic treaty. It was there he visited the Warsaw ghetto memorial to pay his respects to the
victims of the Nazi invasion. In an apparently spontaneous move, Brant knelt down on his knees
before the memorial in a show of deep contrition and respect. This act, known as Kniefall von
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Warschauhas or German Genuflection, has itself been memorialized and represented both a
coming-to-terms with, and apology for, German war crimes. Abe need not necessarily kneel
before any monument, but many feel that the Japanese need their own Kniefall moment: an
undeniable act that helps to heal the past and close that awful chapter in Asian history (Browne,
2015).
The past need not be a ball and chain for Japan. Japanese aggression was only one
chapter in the fantastic history of the people of those islands. And it need not dictate their future
in perpetuity. The Japanese must overcome this history and take their place as an unencumbered
and equal country in the community of nations. It can be done, and, for the safety and security of
the Japanese islands it must be done.
The Eagle’s Back Solution
The United States military is, without a doubt, at one of its lowest points in its two
hundred-plus year history. Especially by Cold War standards, it is an anemic, underfunded
organization, continually putting off the purchase of new weapon systems while refitting existing
ones. Like a rag and bone man, it strips spare parts from junk yards to keep old planes flying and
ships floating. And the ultramodern replacements for existing systems are so expensive that too
few are purchased to fully replace existing numbers. Add to this the United States’ excessive
commitments and conflicts in which it is engaged, and the idea of joining yet another alliance
seems to be too tall an order. Yet, just as military planners in a post-World War II environment
had to make sacrifices and cutbacks, today’s military will have to re-evaluate its priorities in
order to meet the new challenges of the 21st century.
Massive amounts of capital and money were expended by the United States during the
long decades of the Cold War. Technology increased at a dizzying pace partly due to the
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enormous R&D costs of the continuous arms race between the United States and the Soviet
Union. This game would ultimately tax the Soviet system one too many Rubles, causing the
entire Communist confederacy to fold. The United States, on the other hand, did not crumble or
even suffer any adverse effects from its spending spree. On the contrary, the decade following
the end of the Cold War saw America enjoy an economic boom. Of course, part of this
dichotomy can be explained by the Capitalist system the United States used as opposed to the
Communist one of the Russians (Gaddis, 1998). Yet the Americans also made smart decisions
early on in how they would fight the “war,” decisions that should be re-evaluated for their
usefulness today.
As the United States was moving from basking in the light of an Allied victory to the
post-War reality of an ascendant and aggressive Soviet Union, it needed a guide to help it make
the transition. This unlikely guide was a diplomat holed up in the American embassy in Moscow.
George F. Kennan was a Realist in every sense of the word. A straight-shooting, “tell it like it is”
kind of person, Kennan got the chance to tell Washington just exactly what he thought of the
then-American policy towards the Soviet Union. Kennan shocked the Washington establishment
with his “long telegram,” elucidating the intentions of Soviet planners and politicians in stark
terms. Among Kennan’s many contributions to American Cold War policy was his demarcation
of American interests as they relate to American foreign policy (Gaddis, 2005).
Unlike some today who might advocate limitless missions for the United States, Kennan
was quick to point out that American foreign policy must be dictated by vital interests. With
limited resources, the United States simply could not afford to be all places at all times,
combating every form of evil and injustice. He advocated that the United States was best suited
by a “wise economy in the use of [its] strength.” In this vein, he proposed that the United States
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focus on protecting the great industrial centers of the world. Western Europe, North America and
Japan were vital to protecting American interests, and they could not, under any circumstances,
fall into Soviet hands (Gaddis, 2005). Today it might be time to reevaluate what we consider to
be our vital interests.
The United States has committed itself to the defense of dozens of countries the world
over and is simultaneously involved in countless conflicts and low intensity wars. From drug
wars in Columbia to military exercises in Latvia, and foreign aid to Pakistan and Afghanistan,
there is hardly a country on earth that doesn’t have some kind of American military presence.
And these hundreds of commitments cost hundreds of millions of dollars. The Obama
administration’s “pivot” to Asia represented a strategic re-centering of American foreign policy
(FPI, 2016). It recognized the primacy of the Asia-Pacific region to American economic
prosperity and security. Nevertheless, any pivot is twofold: in order to focus on one thing, you
must take your attention off of another. If the United States is going to make a significant
contribution to Asian security, it must draw down its commitments in other parts of the world.
This could mean a myriad of things, but may include actions such as a reduced presence in the
Middle East where, in an age of increasing American energy independence (Yergin, 2013), Gulf
State oil becomes less of a strategic concern. Or, perhaps, it may mean beginning the process of a
détente with Russia, with the realization that Ukraine and Crimea exist within Russia’s sphere of
influence and are not a vital American interest. Whatever shape it takes, American policy makers
would do well to adopt Kennan’s “wise economy” strategy in determining where to focus US
power in the world and where to draw down. No matter where we focus American power,
however, it is still clear that the United States is underfunding its armed forces.
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Simply put, more money must be allocated to the US military. Rebalancing and costcutting can only take the Pentagon so far. Reduced budgets have wreaked havoc on not only the
acquisition of new equipment, but on military readiness and capacity. Military leaders have
repeatedly testified before congress to explain the continuing slide in military readiness. In fact,
many feel that the military has been diminished to the point where it would not be able to fight a
two-front war (Sullivan, 2016). Having the military on such bad footing not only reduces the
credibility of American deterrence, but it, at the same time, would make it extremely difficult to
maintain an Asian-Pacific alliance.
Another way to get more out of the military besides simply throwing more money at it
(though this is needed), is to mix up the kinds of weapons that are being purchased. As we have
seen, the new generation of weapons that the United States military is purchasing is mindbogglingly expensive. For the cost of only one new F35 stealth fighter, the military could
purchase several older model fighter jets. And the new Gerald Ford class aircraft carriers being
constructed by the navy are almost twice as expensive as their Nimitz class predecessors
(Lockie, 2016). Clearly, the bleeding edge of military technology comes at a steep price, but is
there a better way. It would be a mistake to simply say that advanced weapons are not needed or
are too expensive. History has shown time and again that sometimes a technological edge over
an enemy makes all the difference in a battle. This “quality over quantity” approach is one that
has been adopted by the West for thousands of years. But as Stalin once remarked “quantity has
a quality all its own.”
The United States should continue to pursue the latest and greatest but, at the same time,
must maintain a certain quantity of equipment as well. The quantity gaps left by the expense of
new weapons might be filled in by less advanced but still very capable systems. This “high-low”
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approach has been discussed for some time in the military and is somewhat controversial
(Newson, 2015). The concept can best be summed up in the brief anecdote of the diesel
submarine. Diesel submarines are as old as submarines themselves, and for a long time, diesel
was the only power plant available to submariners. But entering into the nuclear age, more
advanced nuclear submarines supplanted and replaced their diesel cousins, at least in the arsenals
of super powers. The United States decommissioned its last diesel submarine during the early
1990’s. However, several European nations and Japan continued to build ever more sophisticated
diesel submarines. These modern diesel boats, unlike their antiquated forerunners from the
Second World War, have the ability to stay submerged for weeks at a time, a capability that was,
until recently, only possessed by nuclear submarines. The US Navy, recognizing the proliferation
of newer, stealthier diesel submarines, rented a state of the art diesel submarine from Sweden for
testing in the United States.
What followed in ensuing war games shocked the US Naval establishment. The little ship
evaded all attempts at locating it and scored many “kills” against aircraft carriers and other ships.
The Navy found that where a nuclear submarine would have been detected, the diesel submarine
slipped through defenses. The takeaway from the story is that not only are the diesel submarines
more capable in certain situations than their nuclear counterparts, they are much more affordable.
For the price of one nuclear submarine, five or more diesels can be purchased (Kazianis, 2016).
Clearly, in an age of limited resources and cash, the United States could pad its forces with
cheaper, but just as capable (and sometimes more capable) options.
If the United States wants to pivot to Asia, or ever build a resilient Asia-Pacific alliance,
let alone balance against China, it needs to drastically reorient its priorities, spend more on its
military, and spend that money smarter. These steps will relieve the strain on a force stretched
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thin while giving it a credible presence in the Asia-Pacific region. And if the US chooses to form
or participate in an Asian-Pacific alliance, it will be able to do so without breaking the bank.
The Nine Dash Solution
It is clear that the contested lines which crisscross the South China Sea have created a
diplomatic nightmare and a protracted problem for the nations involved. Each nation has
overlapping, and sometimes even interchangeable, claims to the islets, rock features and seabed
of the region. Any Asian-Pacific-based alliance with the objective of halting the territorial
advance of China in the South China Sea, or balancing it in the region, would have to decide
what belongs to each nation, and what is worth protecting. As their forbearers in the original
European NATO did, Asian-Pacific NATO would have to decide what constitutes the sovereign
territories which the alliance would actually defend.
Part of the answer to this complex question may lie in international law. The original
NATO was, at first, a controversial organization. Some thought the organization undermined the
legitimacy of the United Nations which had been founded in part to prevent war. However, from
the very beginning, the founders of NATO always sought to base their actions and their
legitimacy in the context of international law and the United Nations charter. Specifically, the
founders rested the legitimacy of NATO within Article 51 of the United Nation Charter. Article
51 reaffirms the right of nations to defend themselves from attack both individually and
collectively until the Security Council of the United Nation can restore peace. That is to say, that
Article 51 explicitly recognizes the legitimacy of collective security organizations and alliances.
With this legal justification, NATO framed its existence in terms of international law, thus
legitimizing its creation and mission. The very language of the NATO treaty constantly refers
back to the United Nations Charter, and speaks of the organization as if it is merely an extension
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of that global body. An Asian-Pacific alliance would do well to emulate the success of NATO by
adopting and framing itself within current international law. The path to affirming its legitimacy
under international law has already been blazed by a diverse number of collective defense pacts
(MacCloskey, 1967). The real challenge for an Asian-Pacific alliance, would be parsing out the
tangled lines in the South China Sea, but here, international law would be just as indispensable.
One of the greatest assets for an Asian-Pacific alliance would be the United Nations’
Law of the Sea, which clearly describes the rights and privileges of those nations which border
an ocean. Nations are entitled to a 12-mile sovereignty zone surrounding their land-mass, as well
as a 200-mile economic exclusion zone. And while there are nations outside of China that have
competing claims in the South China Sea, assent to international law and organizations has been
affirmed by most, if not all, claimants in the region. Yet this assent does not seem to include
China (PCA, 2016).
As we have already seen, China has violated the economic exclusion zone of the
Philippines by constructing artificial islands within the 200-mile limit. This is a clear violation of
international law, and an Asian-Pacific collective security organization would be on solid ground
in demanding the removal of Chinese forces from artificial islands within the 200-mile exclusion
zone.
Whether or not it would be appropriate to engage Chinese naval and marine forces in an
Article 5-type defense on behalf of the Philippines, would be quite another thing. The AsiaPacific alliance might be best to adopt the policy of the original NATO and prevent China from
acquiring further islands and territory. To do this, it must be made clear that any further action
within the 200-mile exclusion zone would be considered a violation of Philippine sovereignty,
triggering an alliance response. Drawing such a line is necessary for deterrence to have any
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substantive meaning. Deterrence exists for the purpose of deterring your adversary from taking
certain unfavorable actions (Gaddis, 2005). If the hypothetical Asian-Pacific alliance did not
make it clear that further incursions would not be tolerated, then all pretense of effective
deterrent would go out the window.
An Asian-Pacific alliance would also be armed with the ruling of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration. The Court, of which most countries surrounding the South China Sea are members
(including China), took up the case of the Philippines, who protested the activities of China in
the South China Sea. In a stunning ruling, the Court struck down the legitimacy of China’s
historical claim to the South China Sea. The nine-dash line has been delegitimized as a stake in
the South China Sea. Furthermore, the Court reaffirmed the UN Law of the Sea by declaring that
artificial islands, whether within the Philippine’s 200-mile EEZ or in international waters, do not
constitute a legitimate legal basis for sovereignty claims (PCA, 2016).
In the eyes of the law, China does not have a leg to stand on in the South China Sea
debate. Just as Soviet occupation of the various Eastern European republics and countries was
illegitimate, so, too, is China’s occupation of marine features within the exclusive economic
zones of surrounding countries. This must be the position of any potential Asian-Pacific alliance.
Based itself in international law, an Asian-Pacific NATO must also appeal to and enforce that
same international law. It must draw a line in the sand, freshly deposited on coral reefs, and
declare that any further advances would be considered acts of aggression. If it does so, it not only
greatly reduces the likelihood of conflict, but would fulfill the very purpose for which it was
created.
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Blow Back Solution
A prospective Asian-Pacific alliance may overcome all of the preceding challenges and
yet still be faced with the possibility of a strong or provocative Chinese response to the formation
of an alliance, leading to a security dilemma. China may choose to restart and accelerate its
island construction programs, or it could begin expanding military outside of the South China
Sea region. It may also forge its own alliance by strengthening ties to Russia or other Central and
Southeast Asian nations.
Of course, we have seen that NATO faced much the same problem with Soviet
expansionism and the creation of the Warsaw pact. The creation of the Warsaw Pact was
precipitated by the addition of West Germany to NATO. Yet, the addition of West Germany to
NATO was seen by Western military strategists as absolutely essential to the defense of Europe.
Provocative as it was, it was also necessary. Likewise, as provocative as an Asian-Pacific
NATO-type alliance might be, it may be absolutely necessary to curtail the current belligerent
actions of Beijing.
As NATO could do little to nothing to stop the formation of the Warsaw Pact, AsianPacific alliance planners would have no control over how China responds. They would, however,
control their counter-response. NATO could never control the actions of Soviet Russia, it could
only deter them. From Korea to Vietnam and Afghanistan, both global behemoths played a high
stakes Chess game with many moves and counter moves. And, as in Chess, NATO and the
West’s ultimate mission was to checkmate the Soviet Union: to hem it in, until it had no more
moves left to make. This strategy of containment was the overarching objective of the United
States and NATO. The Soviet Union could not be allowed to expand any further. On every
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peninsula and in every backwater, the goal was always the same: halt the advance of
Communism.
On every rocky shoal and submerged reef, the goal of Asian-Pacific NATO would be the
same: halt the advance of an aggressive China. Justifying the need for the existence of an AsianPacific NATO is a challenge that can be overcome. Rewriting a constitution written by an
occupying army is a challenge that can also be met. Restoring funding to the United States
military and purchasing effective weaponry is a challenge easily overcome. Parsing out territorial
lines and enforcing international law is also a surmountable challenge. These challenges are all,
in actuality, the constituent steps to solving the real problem of an Asian-Pacific alliance:
Containment. It is the containment of China which is the real challenge for an Asian-Pacific
NATO. But why come to this conclusion? It is, in fact, the same conclusion reached by the
policy makers in Cold War Europe.
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CHAPTER IV: DISCUSSION
It is clear that both the original European NATO and our hypothetical Asian-Pacific
NATO, have faced and would face many difficult challenges. Surprisingly, an Asian-Pacific
NATO would be faced with many challenges that echo ones faced by its predecessor. Yet in
other ways, the two could not be further apart. When we began this thesis, we asked kind of
challenges a potential Asian-Pacific NATO-type alliance might face, now we will compare and
contrast both the real-world NATO and our hypothetical Asian-Pacific NATO.
Beginning with a challenge that both alliances have in common is their need to justify
their very existence. When NATO was created, it was done so with the express purpose of
including the United States. Without such an inclusion, the Brussels Treaty would have been
insufficient as a means of protecting the nations of Western Europe. Just as the Treaty of
Brussels was insufficient to fully protect Western Europe, the hub and spoke system maintained
by the United States, is also lacking in many ways. Specifically, it does not have the advantages
that are inherent in a formal alliance system. It seems clear that, thus far, the current American
lead pseudo-alliance has not checked the territorial advance of China in the South China Sea. In
this respect, the hub and spoke system has demonstrated its inadequacy. It was clear, more than
seventy years ago, that the Treaty of Brussels was insufficient for the defense of Europe. The
answer then was clear: build an alliance. Today, it appears that the American lead coalition of
alliances has not deterred the Chinese from their expansionism in the South China Sea.
Furthermore, the leaders of Asia and America have not, as of yet, moved to enact a formal
alliance. Perhaps, if events in the Asia-Pacific region continue to deteriorate, policy makers and
political leaders, will come to the same conclusion as their European predecessors did.
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Should an Asian-Pacific NATO actually be formed, it would face a challenge strikingly
familiar to the original NATO. Both alliances needed, and need the inclusion of controversial
members. NATO needed to include West Germany in order to have sufficient man-power to
protect Western Europe. This, unfortunately lead to the creation of the Warsaw Pact.
Additionally, France withdrew from the alliance for a time damaging the image of unity that the
defense pact had maintained. However, our Asian-Pacific NATO need not necessarily face these
repercussions. It is unclear whether or not NATO could have mitigated or eliminated the fallout
that occurred after West Germany was many a member. But if Japan were to be made a member
of Asian-Pacific NATO, there are several very clear steps–like apologizing for past war crimes–
that could pave the way for acceptance. Yet, unlike its West German predecessor, the path to
rearmament is a more complicated one for Japan. Nevertheless, it is easy to see the parallels
between the two cases and in looking to the past for lessons, an Asian-Pacific NATO could avoid
or minimize the impact of the inclusion of Japan. But could the new alliance minimize financial
costs?
Whether then or now, the cost of maintaining an alliance is very expensive. However,
during the Cold War, the United States felt that this cost was worth it. Several strategies were
employed in order to maintain the level of spending needed. But perhaps most importantly, the
United States simply spent more than the Soviet Union could on defense. This financial
brinksmanship was one of the primary reasons that the United States emerged as the eventual
victor. Thus, the combined financial might of the members of an Asian-Pacific NATO would be
best utilized by outspending their Chinese opponent in defense. Despite recent cutbacks, the
United States still far outspends China on defense. Combined with Japan and several other
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wealthy nations, this difference would become dramatic. Doing so would mirror the strategy
originally used to defeat the Soviet Union, while spreading costs between the members.
Though both alliances have many things in common, one of the most serious differences
is territorial disputes. Simply put, there were very few, if any territorial disputes during the Cold
War between the Soviet Union and NATO. In the South China Sea, the borders which are
claimed by neighboring nations overlap each other in a complicated web. Deciding what belongs
to whom and what to defend would certainly be a challenge. However, Asian-Pacific NATO
might look to a somewhat dissimilar incident from the historical pages of NATO and the United
States. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States demanded the removal of nuclear
weapons from the island of Cuba. Such weapons threatened the territorial integrity and security
of the United States. However it was only after intense negotiations behind the scenes with the
Soviet Union, and the removal of American missiles from Turkey that the crisis was averted.
Such intensive negotiations and concessions may be needed in the South and East China Seas
before any boundaries might be finalized. Doing so would allow an Asia-Pacific alliance to
lower tensions and avoid an imminent conflict.
Finally, both alliances faced and may face the prospect of blowback. That is to say,
significant consequences from the actions that they take. But, as we have seen with both
alliances, this risk may be hard to eliminate. Undoubtedly there would come a time in the life of
an Asian-Pacific NATO were its actions would be unacceptable to the Chinese. With the
inclusion of West Germany into NATO, the Soviet Union responded by creating the Warsaw
Pact. However, it is hard to see how NATO could have avoided this outcome. Not integrating
West Germany was not an option. Sometimes, it is simply necessary to whether the storm. An
Asian-Pacific alliance may make decisions which outrage the Chinese, but sometimes such
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decisions cannot be avoided. Japan, like West Germany, would be a controversial member of the
Asian-Pacific Alliance. However, like West Germany, Japan is a prosperous and advanced
nation, and an Asian-Pacific alliance could not afford to exclude it. Like its forbearer, an AsianPacific NATO might simply find that it is best to absorb the negative consequences rather than to
capitulate to Chinese demands.
Clearly the challenges that confronted NATO and may confront an Asian-Pacific NATO
are very similar. The original European NATO solved its challenges successfully and emerged
from the Cold War as a victor. Likewise, an Asian-Pacific NATO could make use of many of the
solutions used by the original NATO to tackle its challenges. But while both alliances were and
may be confronted with challenges that are similar, the ultimate challenge for both was and is
containment. The same solutions to NATO’s challenges are very similar to those for AsianPacific NATO. Likewise, the strategy used for containment by NATO and the United States may
still be relevant for an Asian-Pacific NATO today.
The tenets of Cold War containment policy were laid out in the now famous NSC-68
document. NSC-68 was an aggressive strategy that sought to block Soviet advances at every
turn. The purpose was to delegitimize and block further Soviet expansionism, and, in the end, the
plan worked. To meet the modern goal of containing Chinese expansionism, a revised NSC-68,
would have to be drafted for the nascent Asian-Pacific defense pact. While the original threat–
the Soviet Union–has long since disappeared, the steps used to contain it are still relevant to our
Asian-Pacific NATO.
1) Block further Soviet (Chinese) expansion
No more Chinese maritime expansion must be allowed. A red line must be drawn
corresponding to the 200-mile exclusive economic zones of the member countries of the
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Asian-Pacific alliance. It must be made clear that further expansion within these zones
would activate the pact’s defense mechanism and precipitate a military response. In the
thin pocket of international water in the middle of the South China Sea, which is rimmed
by the EEZs of surrounding countries, it must also be made clear that any Chinese islands
constructed in that zone are not, under the Law of the Sea, considered sovereign territory.
Nor do these sandy artifices entitle the builder to oceanic sovereignty or an EEZ zone as
naturally occurring islands do. Building islands in international waters does not make
those waters Chinese. Thus Chinese exclusion and air identification zones around those
particular islands, would not be respected. Furthermore, the alliance might seek to build
its own islands within such waters, so as to negate the Chinese military advantage and
gain parity in capabilities. Clearly, solving one of the original challenges of defining
Article 5 territory fits perfectly into a containment strategy.
2) Expose the falsities of Soviet (Chinese) pretensions
The pretensions, or claims, of the Chinese government to the entirely of the South China
Sea must be continually rejected by the Asian-Pacific alliance. Furthermore, the
foundations of these claims must be exposed as false. The law as it is today would be on
the side of the alliance. The Permanent Court, to which China is a member, has rejected
the validity of historical claims based on the nine-dash line. By this ruling, which the
Chinese are obligated to respect, the nine-dash line no longer is a legal basis for
constructing islands and claiming the sea. In addition, the United Nations Law of the Sea,
which China has ratified, clearly makes Chinese actions within economic exclusion zones
illegal. The defense pact must expose the baselessness of Chinese claims and, in the
process, take away the moral high ground.
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3) Induce retraction of the Kremlin’s (Chinese Politburo’s) control and influence
One of the long-term goals of the alliance should not only be the denial of further
expansion, but the withdrawal of Chinese forces from artificial islands within the 200mile EEZ. In addition, China’s influence over and within other countries should be
curtailed and countered. The original Soviet-Sino Split presented an incredible
opportunity for American diplomacy and strategy. It was important to the United States
to exploit the split between these two power centers and thus weaken the Soviet Union.
But today, Russia and China ironically grow ever closer. Yet in some ways, they have
been driven together. Policy makers might do better to focus less on Russia, whose
modern power is a shadow of its past, and more on China, which is expanding both
territorially and militarily. If a modern détente with Russia could be effected, it would do
much to weaken China militarily and mitigate the possibility of blowback.
4) Foster seeds of destruction within the Kremlin (Chinese Politburo) so as to bring
them to the point of modifying behavior into accord with generally accepted
international standards
While “seeds of destruction” is somewhat ominous, the goal of bringing China into line
with international norms is both desirable and necessary. China is not the only country
with competing claims, but it is the only one which so flagrantly violates international
law and state sovereignty. If China can be brought to the negotiating table and cease in its
illegal activities, then an Asian-Pacific alliance would have accomplished its mission.
The original NSC-68 described one of its goals as maintaining military superiority, but
always keeping the door open to Soviet negotiation and conciliation. China should
always be given the option to conform to international laws and norms. A seat should
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always be left open for them at the negotiating table. Doing so would help to foster a
dialogue and pursue a peaceful resolution to the crisis.
Though the original NSC-68 was an American document, it stressed that its goals would
require the “combined strength” of the United States and its allies to be accomplished. Without
allies, containment would not work. And without a NATO-type alliance in Asia Pacific,
containment there will not work, either. While our two NATO alliances find themselves in
different centuries and on different continents, they are not that dissimilar. Both are tasked with
balancing against a large and powers which were and are perceived to be aggressive. Not
surprisingly, due to their similar missions, both alliances have similar challenges and similar
solutions to those challenges. If an Asian-Pacific NATO is ever to be formed, it will be following
a well-trodden path left by its successful and older predecessor. And if it can do that, it will be
allied and armed with a winning strategy.
Conclusion
When we first began this thesis, we asked what kind of challenges would confront a
hypothetical Asian-Pacific NATO. How would it be constructed and what kinds of strategic
problems would it have to overcome to become as successful as its European counterpart. We
can now see that not only are the challenges similar to the ones which the original European
NATO faced, they are, in fact, surmountable. But even more than being surmountable, the
challenges that we have reviewed are small in comparison to the ultimate challenge faced by an
Asian-Pacific NATO: containment. Just the original NATO was tasked with containing the
Soviet Union, an Asian NATO would be responsible for containing an increasingly expansionist
China.
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This conclusion is firmly rooted in Structural Realist theory. The purpose of alliances
according to Structural Realist theory, is to balance against rising powers and potential
hegemons. China is clearly a rising power and potentially a rising hegemon. Many nations of the
Asia-Pacific region view China’s actions as hostile and unacceptable and may understandably
feel threatened. Separately, there is little chance that they could hope to balance against China.
But together, bound in an alliance, their combined weight might tip the scales. And, one of the
most effective balancing strategies, as demonstrated by the original NATO is containment. If
China continues to act aggressively in the eyes of its neighbors, and does not respond to
international pressure, we might expect that the nations which feel threatened would band
together in a NATO-type alliance. This response would almost be automatic since, according to
Structural Realism, a change in the international structure–such as the rise of China–demands a
response by surrounding states.
However, this conclusion may or may not come to pass, no matter what actions China
takes. For one, events are still unfolding day by day. The situation in the South China Sea is very
volatile, with many different actors, all with different and competing agendas. Perhaps Japan will
sign a peace treaty with China, or the Philippines will negotiate a territorial bargain. Either way,
the status quo is too fluid to effectively predict the future. Another limitation to this study is the
theoretical framework itself. It may not be that the theory of Structural Realism best describes
the situation in Asia, or that it even fully describes it. In fact, there are many different strands of
Realism, let alone other theories. Defensive Realism, for example, may better describe the
current environment and future developments. Other international theories, such as Liberalism,
allow for institutions and norms to have a much greater impact on international affairs, than
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Realist theory allows. Perhaps this will be the case in the Asia-Pacific region. It may be that the
United Nations or some other multilateral or international body finally solves the crisis.
With our findings and subsequent limitations in mind, we hope that future scholars will
explore new avenues of research to determine the likelihood of an alliance system forming in the
Asia-Pacific region. Different methodologies may also shed new light on the present situation
and completely change our understanding of the region and its potential future. Hopefully, this
paper has helped to break new ground. As we have seen, there is little to no current literature
which covers the possibility of a defensive alliance in the Asian-Pacific Region. In the future,
other authors may want to continue investigating this possibility in order to gauge its feasibility.
In any case, it is clear that the situation in the South and East China Seas will most likely
remain relevant and in the headlines for many years to come. Hopefully these future
developments will reflect an easing of tensions and a drawdown in military forces. Yet, should
the situation continue to deteriorate, should China construct more islands or take what appears to
be aggressive actions, we should not be surprised to see the formation of a powerful and modern
Asian-Pacific alliance.
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